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The general objective of the present study is to investigate 
how Thai women make decisions with regard to fertility behavior, 
and what the factors are which influence these decisions. The 
design of the present study is ex post facto in nature, trying to 
explain fertility behavior only after a varying number of births 
have already been given by the women in our sample. 
Research which attempts to understand human behavior through 
the process o± decision making and reasoning often has its challengers. 
Despite our scientific advances, exact observations of human mental 
conditions are extremely difficult. Facing this difficulty, very 
little research in demography attempts to explain fertility from 
the perspective of decision making and reasoning. The general 
argument against such a design of study that attempts to understand 
the mentality of women with regard to fertility behaviors, rests 
primarily upon the following point: it is possible to conceive of 
a reason being given without a consequent action, and of an action 
made for several different reasons. While recognizing this argument, 
for the purpose of this study the emphasis is placed on the latter' 
point, that fertility behaviors like many other human behaviors can 
be explained by several different reasons, each of which is tenable 
for only a particular set of socio-economic conditions. Keeping 
our stated objective in mind, this study is designed to seek an 
understanding of why people want children: what are the special 
joys and rewards that couples envision in the parental role. 
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Background and Sïgnificance of the Study 
In comparison with the experience of a number of other develop- 
ing countries, reproductive behavior in Thailand has undergone a 
major transformation in a relatively short space of time. Recent 
demographic surveys in Thailand indicate that fertility rates 
declined dramatically during the 1970s (see e.g. Knodel and Debavalya, 
1978). Total fertility rates as high as 6.25 during the years 196k- 
65 declined to 3.7 at the end of 1978 (Suvanajata and Kamnuanzilpa, 
1979). 
Very few observers would have predicted the magnitude of change 
that actually occurred. This so-called "reproductive revolution" in 
Thailand needs a theoretical basis for understanding the rapid ferti- 
lity decline within the context of Thai society. Theorizing from a 
demographic point of view, a decline in the national fertility rate 
possibly be explained by several factors. Among them, the most 
important of all are the roles of age structure, nuptiality patterns, 
trends in breast-feeding, reduction in infant mortality and knowledge 
and practice of birth control. 
In the caso of Thailand, changes in the age and marital status 
distributions appear to be minimal during the period ofrtility 
decline. Both the proportion of the population that comprises women 
in the reproductive ages and the age distribution within the repro- 
ductive span have remained relatively stable between 1960 and 1975. 
The singulate mean age of marriage, an estimate of the age at first 
marriage derived from the proportions of those single, indicate 
similar results from various sources (National Research Council 
Panel on Thailand, 1980). Considering the evidence that there has 
been no significant change in the age structure and marriage patterns 
since 1960, fertility decline in Thailand cannot be explained in 
this way. 
Among the most important determinants of fertility in the 
absence of deliberate birth control are lactation practices (ongaarts, 
1978). The contraceptive effects of brea.stfeeding is well documented. 
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Prolonged lactation protects against pregnancy by delaying the 
return of ovulation. Thus changes in breastfeeding practices 
could potentially have a significant effect on fertility. A 
recently completed study has clearly documented a moderate and 
relatively steady decline in the extent of breastfeeding (Knodel 
and Debavalya, 1980). Since the expected effect of a reduction 
in breastfeedirig would be to increase fertility if other factors 
remained unchanged, the decline in fertility in Thailand cannot 
be explained by changes in breast feeding. The main reason why 
fertility did not increase as a result of reduced breastfeeding 
is that a massive increase in contraceptive use occurred at the 
same time. Evidence from the surveys clearly indicates that the 
recent decline in fertility in Thailand has been accompanied by a 
dramatic increase in the knowledge and practice of contraception. 
(Knodel and Debavalya, ].978 and Suvanajata and Kamnuansilpa, 1979). 
In most countries, the period of fertility decline was 
preceded and accompanied by an improvement in mortality conditions. 
One recent set of estimates of mortality in Thailand indicates a 
fairly steady decline in the crude death rate since 1920, with the 
exception of the turbulent years during the Second World War 
(ESCAP, 1976). An important component of the improved mortality, 
since 1960 at least, has been a reduction in infant and child 
mortality (National Research Council Panel on Thailand, 1980). 
This reduction of infant mortality may have some effect on ferti- 
lity. As parents become more certain that they will have enough 
immber of children around in their old age, they may start to 
limit the number of births. The limitation of number of births 
in many cases corresponds with the actual desire for a lower number 
of children than ever before. As contraception is becoming more 
prevalent, the married couples have more control of their family 
size. The reasons leading to the decision to have a small family 
size, however, is unclear to us. Equally perplexing are those 
couples who, in the midst of changing family size norms from large 
to small, desire to maintain their size at the traditional high 
level. 
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With the background of fertility decline provided here, one 
can visualize the importance of this study. On the theoretical 
side, it will help generate a theory for explaining fertility 
behavior. On the actual usage, we consider that since the decline 
of fertility in Thailand is explained mostly by the widespread 
practices of contraception, the understanding of the decision 
making process or the rationale leading to the desire or lack of 
desire for a large family may help in the recruitment of contracep- 
tive adoptors, which is an important factor in the success of the 
population control program. Without the knowledge and understanding 
of why some women want to limit their family size, the recruitment 
of contraceptive adoptors may have to be carried out randomly and 
purely on the basis of nonspecific propaganda, rather than on 
specific and effective campaigning. 
Brief Review of Related Literature 
A review of research on fertility indicates that, within the 
past 30 years, most studies have focused and documented fertility 
differentials on the basis of numerous socio-economic and demogra- 
phic variables. For example, studies conducted by Freedman, et. al. 
(1959) and Westoff and his associates, (Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, 
1963; Westoff, Potter, Sagi and Mishler, 1961) found an inverse 
relation between education and fertility among Protestants as well 
as higher fertility among the Catholics, relative to non-Catholics. 
There have also been the relatively plentifi]. data on differential 
fertility by social class or socio-economic status. Summaries of 
such data appeared in the works of many people. For example Wrong 
(1958 and 1960), Johnson (1960), Kiser (1960) and Glass (1968) all 
showed the negative relationship between fertility and socio- 
economic status. Similar studies were also conducted in less 
developed countries. In Thailand, for example, Knodel and Pra- 
chuabmoh (1973) and Goldstein (1972) found an inverse relationship 
between fertility and women's education, especially among urban 
women. Goldstein (1970) found considerable differences in fertility 
among Buddhists, Moslems and Confucianiste. Knodel and Prachuabmoh 
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(1973), using the Material Possessions Score as an indication of 
wealth, found that a simple inverse relationship between fertility 
arid wealth did not emerge. When controlling for the effects of 
age and residence, women in rural households with the highest 
material possessions scores have approximately average fertility 
among the younger women, well below average fertility among the 
women 3O_Lf years of age, and well above average fertility among 
the older women. In contrast, women in urban households with the 
highest material possessions score, consistently have the lowest 
fertility for all three age groups although the difference between 
the lowest and highest is minimal for wives aged +5 and over. In 
addition, in all three urban age groups, the mean number of 
children ever born follows a curvilinear path by rising and then 
falling as they pass from the lowest material possessions score 
category to the highest. 
Taking all these studies into consideration, certainly they 
have greatly advanced our understanding o demographic and social 
correlates of fertility. However, they are far from informatively 
satisfying. We do not fully understand why people of certain 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics have a particular 
level of fertility. 
The studies of demographic and social correlates of fertility 
can be more intelligible to ourselves only when we can hypothesize 
an intervening mechanism. In sociological studies of fertility, it 
is generally almost certain that this mechanism can be detected 
from information on the mental states of women: the feelings and 
decisions that they have taken. The implicit assumption here is 
that individual fertility decisions are influenced by several 
interacting intervening mechanisms, which can be unraveled through 
the inquiry of the decision process made by an individual. Thus, 
only after understanding these mental states do we feel that we 
have adequately explained the fertility behavior. 
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Discouragingly, attempts to understand and explain fertility 
differentials in terms of psychological factors have not penetrated 
the mentality of women (e.g. Kiser and Wheipton, 1958; Westoff et. 
al., 1961; Westoff et. a].., 1963; Westoff and Potvin, 1967; Bumpass 
and Westoff, 1971), thus having less theoretical merit than those 
studies of social correlates. The work by a number of investigators, 
however, can be taken to defend the theoretical merit of the social 
psychological studies. Among these, Rainwater (1965) in particular, 
suggested that demographic variables by and of themselves cannot 
explain why people want or do not want a child. Essentially, his 
contribution lies in both documenting the rationale behind fertility 
behavior and also in ferreting out the social psychological forces 
that effect the decision. Moreover, at one point, he dealt with the 
culture and social system within the subgroup which differentially 
influenced fertility behavior. Described in great detail in the 
book entitled, And the Poor Get Children, Rainwater and Weinstein 
(1960) documented the social preconditions for mental states among 
a sample of lower-class white couples in Chicago and Cincinnati that 
led to ineffective contraception-high fertility. Furthermore, his 
research interestingly showed that the segregated conjugal role 
relationship characterized by poor communication induces poor con- 
traception. For many working-class couples, the lack of communication 
was the force that obliterated the fully conscious rationale. 
The research by Rainwater (1965) and Rainwater and Weinstein 
(1960) are two important contributions, since they not only help 
understand fertility-related behavior but also determine the process 
by which group norms, social and economic conditions operate through 
mentality. This significance of Rainwater's contribution has been 
mentioned in Jaccard and Davidson (1976), who have adopted Fishbein's 
(1972) model and a social psychological approach in understanding 
fertility decisions. Their data strongly supported the hypothesis 
that a woman's intention to engage in a fertility-related behavior 
would be highly correlated with (a) her beliefs about the consequences 
of performing that behavior weighted by the value of those conse- 
quences, and/or (b) her beliefs about what significant others think 
she should do and her motivation to comply with those others. 
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Their study has been successfully focused on the identification 
of variables that determine intentions to engage in fertility- 
related behaviors. However, the question of the fit between the 
intention and actual behavior remains challenging. In fact this 
issue was the predominant theme in social psychology in the late 
1960s. Unfortunately, the development in social science has not 
advanced enough to the point where we can perfectly predict the 
overt behavior from intention. This issue however, will be care- 
fully guarded and will have minimal relevance to this study, as we 
are looking at the total decision process by which the women 
decided to have or not to have children, The attention here is 
placed not on the issue of prediction, but the explanation of 
child bearing behavior in an ex post facto mariner. 
Some Theoretical Explanations of Fertility Decisions 
Early theoretical works' attempt to explain fertility were 
macroscopic in nature and based on an observation of the historical 
evidences of demographic and socioeconomic development of the 
western world during the nineteenth century and the first half of 
the twentieth. The theories hypothesizing a negative correlation 
of economic and social development and fertility were more or less 
generally accepted by demographers until the l960s. At the same 
time the idea of a positive correlation of income or economic 
conditions and fertility also made regular appearances (Andorka, 
1978). The line of reasoning of the early theories was followed 
by the new formulations of the so-called economic theory of 
fertility. The two basic tenets of this theory are that: 
Couples behave in a rational way when they decide on the 
number of children they want to have. 
Children are viewed by the couples more or less as 
consumption goods. 
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The economic theory has gained acceptance quite widely arid 
has given rise to two main conflicting but interesting hypotheses. 
If based on some observations of consumption patterns of individuals 
with different income levels, it is hypothesized that individuals 
with a higher income level will always be associated with a more or 
less higher number of children per family. This hypothesis is 
impressive and very elegant when we look into the logic of consump- 
tion decisions derived from plotting the indifference curves and 
budget lines (see Andorka, 1978). Furthermore, it has the advan- 
tage of integrating the theory of fertility into the broader 
decuctive economic theory of consumer choices, or--as it haa been 
recently called--the theory of household production and consumption. 
The problem, however, is how to reconcile it with not just the 
hypothesis of the negative relationship between income and fertility 
but with the actual known cases of societies or social strata where 
families with higher incomes have lower fertility than those having 
lower income. Several theoriste of this economic theory of fertility 
have attempted various solutions to this dilemma. 
Becker (1960) provided the simplest explanation. In his 
opinion the most important factor causing the apparent negative 
relation of income and fertility is the level of information on 
methods of birth control. Population groups of lower income can 
be assumed to be less informed on contraceptive methods, and 
therefore practice very little contraception, if any. It is a10 
assumed that populations having a lower income have more children 
than they actually want. If, however, in the future all population 
groups were equally well informed on birth control on positive 
relation would prevail. 
Interestingly, it is thought that in the absence of differences 
of knowledge on contraception, all couples will behave and calculate 
in the same rational way when they plan their purchases of consumer 
durables. They take into consideration the cost or price of the 
goods and of the children, as well as their disposable income. 
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Becker also introduced the idea of quality of children to account 
for the decisions of the couples. It seems that he assumed that 
just like consumer durables, all couples want the quality of their 
children. Therefore, parents having a higher income not only want 
more children, but also spend more money per child in order to 
enhanCe their quality. Obviously it is imaginable that couples 
with higher income want so spend all their extra money on the 
improvement of the quality of a given number of children and do 
not want to have more children. Becker, however, seems to have 
assumed that this is not the case; the couples with higher income 
wanting more and at the same time better quality children. He 
seems to overlook that there is a fundamental distinction between 
the prices of children and the commodities that regulate the 
decision of how much money to spend on the quality of children. 
11hile the price of commodities is identical for households at 
different income levels, the price of the quality of children is 
a function of the family income and status. Okun (1958) considered 
that the minimum cost per child is lower for low income and low 
status families than it is for high income and high status families1 
because children cannot be brought up at a much lower level of 
living than that of their parents, If the cost of children is 
higher at the higher income levels, it may well be that the 
couples will decide to have a smaller number of children at a 
higher income level. 
Leibenstein (197k), who was the first to formulate the new 
economic theory of fertility, looked at the decision to have any 
number of children from the perspective of the utility of children. 
According to him there are three trpes of utility for which a child 
is wanted: (i) consumption utility, i.e. the child as a source of 
personal pleasureof the parents, (2) work or income utility, i.e. 
the benefits derived from the fact that the child sooner or later 
enters the labor force and provides help either on the farm or in 
the workshop of the family, or earns an income to add to the common 
fund of the household, and (3) the security utility, derived from 
the fact that the child will be a potential source of security and 
help for the parents, especially in old age. While there are 
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utilities, there are also coats or disutilities of children. The 
two types of costs or disutilities are: direct and indirect costs. 
The direct costs involve, for example, feeding, housing and providing 
education for children. The indirect costs frequently may be consi- 
dered as opportunity costs, arising from, for example, the income 
earning foregone by the parents because of the efforts needed to 
raise the child. Leibenstein also considered that1 while the con- 
sunption utility of the child does not change when income rises, 
both work and security utility decrease, because at a higher level 
of income children are educated for a longer period and therefore 
enter the labor force later, and because it is possible to assure 
other sources of security for the parents. Direct costs in money 
terms certainly increase with income, but it is not certain whether 
the disutility of bearing these costs also increases in terms of the 
utility of the goods given up to bear these costs (at higher income). 
On the other hand, the indirect costs could be very important at 
higher income levels, because the couples might be obliged to give 
up important earning activities and very desirable consumption 
activities such as recreation. 
Also from Leibenstein's work, an assumption can be made that 
marginal utilities of the nth child are lower than those of the 
(n-l)th child. When parents decide the number of children they 
want, they compare the expected utilities and disutilities and 
decide to have the nth child if the utilities are higher than 
disutilities. 
If the slope of the utility and disutility functions of the 
nth child and (n-l)th child are similar to those in the figure given 
by Leibenstein (l97L1.), then the couples at a lower income level may 
want to have more children (n) than at a higher income level (n-l). 
However, it might be conceived that the disutilities of children 
decrease at higher income levels, because the utilities that must 
be foregone due to the larger number of children are less important 
at these higher income levels, and in that case the representative 
couple may want more children at a higher income level. Therefore 
the curves of the utility and disutility of children will be of a 
different slope. 
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Mincer (1963) developed the line of reasoning further, 
emphasizing the importance of indirect costs. He stressed that 
any consumption might entail opportunity, the most important of 
all being the time spent in connection with consumption (of 
children). Obviously the pleasure of having (or consuming) 
children requires a great deal of time, most of all from the 
side of the mother, who for that reason may have to forgo income 
from gainful employment. The relinquished income of the wife 
who bears and cares for children might not have been a very 
important cost for those with low education, who could attain 
only very low wages, but for those with high education the addi- 
tional earning of the wife might be a very important component 
of the income of the family. 
The economic theory of fertility has been strongly criticized 
by several demographers. Blake (1968a), for example, suggested 
that children cannot be considered analogous to consumer durables 
for several reasons. First, parents are obliged to provide a 
certain standard of care and education for their children; and they 
are condemned by public opinion if they have so many children that 
they cannot provide this standard. Therefore adults are not as 
free to choose the number of their children as they are in deciding 
whether or not to buy certain consumer durables. Second, parents 
are not able to choose the quality of their children, since this 
depends on many other (e.g. genetics) factors in addition to care 
and education. Third, where parents are not satisfied with the 
number and quality of their children, they are not free to change 
them, as they may change consumer durables if they are not satis- 
fied with them. Fourth, parents are not free to use (and abuse) 
their children, as they are free concerning the use of their con- 
sumer durables. Parents are socially and legally required to 
adequately care for their children. Fifth, the costs of children 
are misinterpreted by Becker, since on the one hand they include 
the indirect or opportunity costs of the time required for their 
care, and on the other hand the direct costs of children are also 
differentiated by social strata because of the different standards 
accepted by them. Therefore a positive relation of fertility to 
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income is most improbable. According to Blake, "fertility is 
determined by the characteristics of family and the general 
norms and values attributed to the concept of family in the 
given society, and the more fundamental changes of fertility 
are caused by the change of the institution of family, there- 
fore a theory of reproductive motivation is at the saine time 
a theory of the family and society" (p. 214). 
Following the economic theory of fertility and the 
critique of it by Blake, Easterlin (1969) developed a theoretical 
framework in which he tried to combine the points of view of the 
economic and sociological theories. 
According to Easterlin, fertility is the result of deli- 
berate choices taken by the couple, similar to other decisions 
on consumption, production and earning activities. Thus the 
number of children of the couple is also determined by their 
income, the prices (costs) of children and other goods and their 
tastes. The preference for the number of children should be 
viewed along with the household's desires for other goods. 
Easterlin's concept of income, however, is somewhat dif- 
ferent from those of Becker's original theory. It is not the 
income observed at any point in time that influences the decisions 
on fertility of the household. Rather, these decisions are 
governed by the long-term income prospects, or the potential income. 
The concept of costs of children is also refined by Easterlin. 
He does not agree with Duesenberry (l96o) who considered that these 
costs are higher for rich families. He believes that these costs 
are more or less identical; and the higher expenditures per child 
in rich families is a reflection of the preference for better 
quality children and the higher income available for spending on 
children. In his cost concept, he considers that costs should 
include the opportunity costs of the time needed for taking care 
of children. Obviously, a woman who has a large family must spend 
much time on the children, and therefore has less time left for 
either earning activities or recreation. This cost might be 
measured by the income she could achieve by being employed during 
the time she spends on child care. 
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Interestingly, Easterlin saw a dual effect of potential 
income on fertility. On one hand, the rise in potential income 
tends to increase fertility, but on the other hand, by being 
employed the opportunity costs of child care are increased, 
which tends to diminish fertility. The two effects might be 
called income effect (a greater number of children can be 
achieved with higher income) and substitution effect (at higher 
income levels couples can find alternatives to child care). If 
the substitution effect outweighs the income effect, it may lead 
to negative relation of fertility of income, as found by some 
investigators. 
Another interesting point of Easterlin is that he did not 
consider that unwanted pregnancies are simply the consequences of 
lack of knowledge on contraception, as supposed by Becker. He 
hypothesized that people are more or less universally aware of 
methods of fertility control. Since he also introduced an element 
of costs of contraception into the theory, his explanation for 
high fertility in some couples lies in the psychological costs of 
contraception. Some couples might consider that it is more worth- 
while to take the risk of another pregnancy than to accept the 
annoyances connected with fertility control. 
The most important innovation of Easterlin in the economic 
theory of fertility is that he considered tastes to be different 
for individual families, social strata, denominational or ethnic 
groups, etc. Tastes as considered by Easterlin tend to be varied 
and changing over time, moulded by socialization, by education, 
and in general by the influence of social environment during the 
whole span of life. Leibenstein (1976) later refined Easterlin's 
conceptual framework by adding that, in addition to the influence 
of the parental family, peer groups might also influence the 
tastes, or aspirations of young couples (in Leibenstein expressions). 
Leibenstein distinguished between committed income and that portion 
of income immediately available for expenditures. It might happen 
that committed income for the fulfilment of aspirations concerning 
living standard and social status is rising more rapidly than total 
income; in that case the number of chïldren declines. 
Similarly, Oppenheimer (1976) considered that consumption 
aspirations are formed not only during adolescence in the parental 
family but also in adult life, He believed that chan.ges in the 
direction of more activeness in women's economic roles will help 
perpetuate low fertility. Part of the reason is that, relative 
to the former generation of the baby boom period, wives of younger 
generations participated in the labor force because of the 
aspiration to raise the family's level of living. 
By considering tastes to be dynamic, Easter1in has introduced 
the basic characteristics of the sociological approach into the 
study of fertility. In his opinion, social norms are the conceptual 
equivalents of tastes. However, Hawthorn (1970) did not agree and 
stated that a taste is like a desire for something, and should be 
more similar to the concepts of values. 
So much for the economic and sociological theories of ferti- 
lity. Recently, a psychological approach to studying fertility 
has been developed (see Fawcett, 1973). Although the results so 
far are still hypothetical and quite often contradictory, its 
characteristic of being interdisciplinary in nature seems prorising. 
Several psychoanalysts and authors in related fields have 
dealt with the desire to have a child (Benedek, 1959; Erikson, 
196k; Kestenberg, 1965a, l965b and 1968). Pohiinan (1969) offered 
some psychoanalytical explanations for the desire to have a child, 
among which were (see also in Andorka, 1978: 333): 
Having a child fulfils the need of men to show virility. 
A woman can compete with her mother by having a baby. 
Husbands may want their wives to suffer with pregnancy, 
childbirth and child care to atone 2r their own guilt. 
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4 The child is considered an extension of the ego and may 
satisfy the desire for immortality. 
The problem with Pohmart's explanations is that they only 
explain the desire to have a child or children in general but not 
the desire to have few or many. 
Another theory that tries to explain the size of family by 
psychological factors uses the concepts of alienation and moderni- 
zation, both considered to be characteristics of advanced societies. 
Hoffman and Wyatt (1960) hypothesized that the increasing alienation 
and loneliness of men and women in modern mass societies enhance the 
value of the family and of children, since they might alleviate 
these feelings by providing companionship and a sense of life. 
Hoffman and Wyatt also pointed to two other developments in modern 
society that favor large families. Increase in the status of women 
through labor force participation can mean that the household no 
longer provides a meaningful role for them. In these conditions, 
having a child, or an additional child when the older ones need 
less maternal care, provides an escape from both the dull housewife 
role and the problematical working wife role. At the saine time a 
growing emphasis on the importance of the parental role reinforces 
the desirability of this escape role. Thus according to this theory, 
some psychological factors developed in advanced societies favor a 
rise in fertility. 
On the other hand, the modernization theory posits that the 
development of societies ín the direction of increasing moderniza- 
tion both at the societal level and individual level leads to a 
decline in fertility (Fawcett and Bornstein, 1973). Modernization 
is considered to be a syndrome of personality traits, among which 
can be listed: readiness for new experiences and openess to inno- 
vation and change; opinions of others not automatically accepted 
or rejected on the basis of their status or power; time orientation 
towards the present and future, rather than the past; acceptance of 
fixed hours, punctuality; orientation towards planning; a belief 
that man can dominate his environment to achieve his goals; faith 
in science and technology. It has been hypothesized that the 
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spread of these traits in developing socieites lias been paralled 
with the decline in fertility during demographic transition. 
However, the empirical researches performed in advanced societies, 
particularly in the United States, were not very successful in 
fïnding correlations between fertility and personality traits. 
Recently, Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) elaborated a scheme 
for the psychological value of children. The following eight 
psychological benefits of children were given: 
The birth of a child assures the adult status and adult 
social identity of the parents. This status and 
identity may need reconfirmation by subsequent births. 
Children may give feelings of expansion of self for the 
parents, of immortality, of a tie to a larger society 
or community. 
Children help to develop the feeling in the parents 
that they are moral, altruistic, following the commands 
of their religion, doing good for their social group; 
women having children are tended to be viewed as "good 
women," more faithful. to their husbands. 
k. The birth of children strengthens the nuclear family, 
the one important primary group in advanced societies 
that has permanence and therefore serves as a bulwark 
against irnpersonalization and loneliness. Children 
especially are apt to fulfil the needs for affection 
of parents, particularly perhaps of women. 
Children are a source of constant stimulation, novelty 
and fun for parents. 
Rearing of children provides an outlet fox' creativity, 
achievement and accomplishment. Needs for such activities 
are probably emerging more and more strongly in advanced 
societies, as basic subsistence needs are satisfied for 
most families within society. 
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The birth of a child enhances the power of the parent in 
the kinship group, enhances the position of the mother 
vis-a-vis the husband, arid even vis-a-vis her own 
parents. At the same time, the children afford both 
parents opportunities for another form of power namely, 
to guide, teach, control and influence them. 
Children may enhance the prestige of parents in the 
larger primary groups to which they belong. 
The East-West Population Institute in Hawaii recently engaged 
in a survey of the value of children and looked at the value of 
children from the point of both advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantages of children were coded as: 
Happiness, love and companionship provided by the 
existence of children. 
Personal development of the parents. 
Child rearing satisfactions. 
1+. Economic benefits and security. 
Benefits for the nuclear family unit. 
Benefits for the larger kin group. 
Social and religious values. 
Intrinsic value of having children. 
The disadvantages of having children were coded as: 
'inancia1 costs. 
Emotional costs. 
Restrictions on alternative activities (career, 
recreation, etc.) 
k. Problems caused in marriage. 
Costs for the kin group. 
Societal costs, overpopulation. 
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The review of the theoretical explanation of fertility 
behaviors advanced in this section suggests that several socio- 
logical, economic and psychological factors may have been inter- 
woven in the decision of people to have any number of children. 
Unlike in other living species, having a child or an offspring 
ha8 almost been a conscious, calculated and rational behavior of 
man within the marriage unions. In spite of these generalization 
we still need more research to uncover the reasons that lead more 
specifically and deeply to the understanding of the decisions to 
have a different number of children among different married couples. 





A ,major goal in the design of sampling in this study was 
to obtain reliable data for understanding fertility decisions, or 
reasons which led to the desire to have children. To achieve that 
end, data for this research were collected from a sample of 305 
ever-married women from two provinces, selected on the basis of 
fertility rates, i.e. one with high growth and the other with low 
growth. The two selected provinces are Nongkai and Lumpoon. 
According to our calculation from the data on death and birth 
registrations, Nongkai ranked among one of the highest population 
growth areas. In 1977 the growth rate of Nongkai was 2.7 percent 
per annum, as compared to only 0.7 percent for Lumpoon. The 
differences in terms of fertility rates of the two provinces should 
provide some interesting points of comparison in the way women make 
decisions regarding having children. 
Multi-stage sampling techniques were employed in the selection 
of respondents in this atudy. More specifically, the selection 
process, after selection of the sample provinces, comprised three 
stages. A brief description of each of these stages follows. 
First, in each province three districts were drawn, with the sti- 
pulation that one of them had to be Muang district, while the other 
two were randomly selected. The inclusion of Mtzang district 
stemmed from the reason that we wanted to stratify our sample areas 
into three gradients of urbanization, namely: provincial urban 
area or municpal area, sanitary district (area) and rural area. 
Administratively, each municipal area, the place classified as 
urban in Thailand, is located in Muang district. Thus Muang 
district had to be selected before we could select the respondents 
in the provincial urban center. 
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In the second stage, after selection of the districts, 
cluster samples were employed within each district; sampling 
lists of eligible women were conducted at this level to provide 
a sample frame for the selection of respondents. 
In the final stage the respondents were randomly selected 
from among eligible women in each cluster selected in the second 
stage. The probability of being included in the sample was, 
however, not equal for each cluster, because the number of 
selected women were restricted to the quota of approximately 150 
for each province, or approximately 50 for each urbam center, 
sanitary district and rural at'ea. 1t shOuld be- noted that the 
samp]e design oft-this study was not intended to provide 
estiniates of any paramèt:ers át either the ation1. or 
s-ubnationai levels Rathe'., the designi is simeth at uieratding 
fertility decisioeis, after tdkin into consideration the differences 
in group fertility behavior. 
Activities in the Field 
The field work for the research was carried out between 
May 15 and June 30, 1979, by a team of six interviewers, one 
supervisor and two project investigators. In all two selected 
provinces the team stayed either in the provincial or district 
town until all the interviews were completed. If the interviewers 
were unable to complete an interview after three call backs, a 
previously selected substitute respondent was interviewed. 
Substitute respondents were selected at the time of the selection 
of the original sample. The average duration of an interview was 
30 minutes. 
Some measures of quality control were observed during the 
field work. In the early stage of the field work the supervisor 
and project investigators closely observed the interviews and 
provided assistance when the interviewer or the respondent failed 
to communicate effectively. The interviewers were instructed to 
submit the completed questionnaires to the supervisors daily, and 
all questionnaires were examined carefully to identify errors in 
data entry, as well as inconsistent or doubtful responses. 
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Field supervisors reinterviewed sorne respondents to verify 
interview results. This was done more frequently when responses 
were omitted or there were major inconsistencies. Spot checks 
were also made during the field work to be sure that the inter- 
viewers were following the correct sample selection procedure. 
Coding and Editing 
After the field work the questionnaires were sent to the 
Research Center, National Institute of Development Administration, 
for editing, punching, and further data processing. 
All punched cards were edited by computer. Editing instruc- 
ions were prepared, and the editing program was written. It 
included the following steps: 
List all cards to see that the number of cards is 
correct; 
Check that only legitimate codes appear in each column 
and that no wi].d" codes are present; 
Check the logical consistency of codes between columns 
and cards. 
The editing was done step by step. A mistake in each step 
was corrected before beginning the next step. After the machine 
editing, the frequency distributions of all variables were deter- 
mined and reviewed to identify any unusual responses. 
Characteristics of the Sample 
A brief summary of the characteristics of the women inter- 
viewed provides a reference for interpreting the findings presented 
in this report. A calculation of the average age of the group 
found it to be 33 years. Table 1 shows the age structure of the 
sample. It can be seen that most (22.3%) of the women in the sample 
were between the ages of 25-29. The second largest group comprised 
women in the range of 30-3k years. Except for the youngest group, 
the rest of the women were nearly equally distributed. 
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Table 2. Distribution of the Sample by Wife's Education 
Table 1. Age Structure of the Sample 
Age Frequency Percentage 
15-19 





25 - 29 68 22.3 
30-3k 57 18.7 
35 - 39 k7 15.k 
140-k+ '+8 15.7 
'+5 - '+9 3k 11.]. 
Total 305 100.0 
To Education 11 3.6 
Primary 225 73.8 
Secondary & Above 69 22.6 
Total 305 100.0 
Level of Education Frequency Percentage 
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In terms of education, Table 2 demonstrates that most 
(73.8%) of the women in the sample finished no more than 
primary education. Women whose educational background was 
secondary school or higher represented only 22.6 percent. 
A similar pattern can be seen in Table 3 when women in the 
sample were characterized by their husband's education. 
Table 3. Distribution of the Sample by Husband's Education 
Don't Know 3 0.9 
No Education 10 3.3 
Primary 186 61.0 
Secondary & Above 106 3k..8 
Total 305 100.0 
The proportion of women by marital status are shown in 
Table 1+. It can be seen that 93.1 percent of the women were 
currently married. Among this group, approximately 9.9 percent 
were not living with their spouse. Their separate residences 
were attributed mainly to occupational requirement and were 
temporary in nature. The women who were permanently separated 
from their husbands comprised only 1 percent. Divorcees and 
widows also had small shares in the sample (2.3% and 3.6% res- 
pectively). 
Described in terms of employment status, approximately 90 
percent of the women were working outside the home. This level 
of labor force participation was quite high and nearly equals the 
99 percent level of employment of their husbands. 
Level of Education Frequency Percentage 
2k 
Table k. Distribution of the Sample by Marital Status 
Table 5. Distribution of the Sample by Occupation 
Occupation Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture 133 1+3.6 
Government Officials k9 16.1 
Trade 57 18.7 
Skilled and Semi- 
skilled Workers 
14.9 
Unskilled Workers 17 5.6 
Housewife 3k 11.]. 
Total 305 100 O 
Separation 3 1.0 
Divorce 7 2.3 
Widow 11 3.6 
Total 305 100.0 
Marital Status Frequency Percentage 
Currently married 256 83.9 
Currently married 
(but not living 28 9.2 
with husband) 
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Table 7. Distribution of the Sanp1e by Monthly Income 
Income Frequency Percentage 
Below 1,000 So 26.2 
1,000 - 1,999 81 26.6 
2,000 - 2,999 ¿4.1 13.1+ 
3,000 - 3,999 32 10.5 
1+1000 - k,999 1k 1+. 6 
5,000 + 18.1+ 
Don't Know 1 0.3 
Total 305 100.0 










Table 5 indicates that almost half (43.6%) of the women 
participated in agricultural related work. Less than 20 percent 
worked either in trade or for the government. Even less were 
employed in the categories of skilled and semi-skilled workers 
or unskilled workers. 
As reflected by the predominance of agricultural activities 
in Thailand, Table 6 shows that 39.3 percent of the women gave us 
the information that their husbands worked in agriculture, and 
23.0 percent in a government office. Trade represented only 9.5 
percent, as compared to 15.1 percent of unskilled workers and 7.6 
percent of skilled and semi-skilled types of work. 
The final characteristics to be looked at is income. Table 7 
presents the distribution of the sample in terms of monthly family 
income. Slightly more than half (52.8%) of the sample earned less 
than 2,000 Baht per month. A little over three-fourths received 
less than 4,000 Baht. In general, it can be seen that the levels 
of income in the sample are fairly well distributed. 
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CHAPTER III 
FERTILITY AND CONTRACEPTIVE BEHAVIORS 
Age-Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
Estimates of age-specific marital fertïlity rates can be 
derived from the birth data collected from respondents in the 
interviews. These data were examined to determine the number of 
births, reported by cur?ently married women in the year prior to 
the field work. 
Table 8. Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
Table 8 describes the level of fertility in our sample. 
It can be seen that the highest fertility was in the young cohorts. 
Women aged 15-19 had the highest fertility level (600 births per 
1,000 currently married). After the age of 19 the women began to 
show a pattern of decline in fertility with advanced age. By the 
time the women were between the ages of 20-2k their fertility had 










declined by almost one-half, and by almost two-thirds between 25- 
29 years. It can be seen that women in our sample completed their 
fertility by the time they were years old; they did not bear 
any more children. 
Percent Pregnant and Number of Children Ever Born 
In addition to age-specific marital fertility rates, fertility 
levels in our sample can be described by the percentage of women 
being pregnant at the time of interviewing. A result of our analysis 
found that approximately 19 percent of the women were pregnant. This 
level of pregnancy is higher than the average of only 10 percent 
found in one of the most recent national surveys of contraceptive 
and fertility behavior (see Suvanajata and Kamnuansilps, 1979). This 
difference is attributed to methodological differences, and does not 
reflect any actual difference or an increase in the proportion of 
pregnant women. 
Another measure of fertility is an average number of children 
ever born. It was found that women in the sample had an average of 
3.2 children. Further examination of' data on the basis of provinces 
found that women in Nongkai province had more children (.o) than 
those in Lumpoon province (2.3). The figures derived from this 
study confirm the data from the birth registration of the Department 
of Local Administration which also showed that Nongkai province had 
a higher birth rate than Lumpoon province. 
Fertility Differentials 
The data on children ever born were used to calculate the 
fertility differentials in the three most important and interrelated 
variables, namely education, occupation and income. 
* 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
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Table 9. Number of Children Ever Born by Respondent's Education by Age 
Age 
Education 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- LfO.. 1+5- 




Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
No Education a * * a a a a 
Primary * 1.3 2.0 3.1 3.8 1+.6 7.0 3.1+ 
Secondary * 0.8 1.2 2.5 3.1+ 3.2 * 2.0 
College * * * a * a * 2.1 
Total 1.0 1.2 1.9 3.1 3.7 '+.k 6.3 3.2 
Table 10. Number of Children Ever Born by Respondent's Education by 
Marriage Duration 
Education 
Marriage Duration All 
Ages 0-3 1+-6 7-9 10-12 13+ 
No Education t a a a 6.0 k.8 
Primary 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.8 5.0 3.1+ 
Secondary 0.8 1.2 2.2 2.6 3.7 2.0 
College 1.0 * t a 2.8 2.1 
Total 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.9 k.9 3.2 
Wife's Education 
The relationship between the educational level attained by 
ever-married women and their cumulative fertility controlling for 
age and for marriage duration is presented respectively in Tables 
9 and 10. For the total sample there seems to be an inverse 
relationship between level of education and number of children 
ever born. Women 4th no formal education bore an average of Li.8 
children, while those who finished primary school had 3»4 children, 
about 1.14. children more than those who finished secondary school. 
Those who finished some college education had (2.1) a very slightly 
higher number of children than those who finished secondary educa- 
tion (2.0). This difference between the two groups was not signi- 
ficant and was attributed more to sampling fluctuation due to the 
small number of cases who had sorne college education rather than 
true actual differences in the two categories of education. 
When the effects of age were controlled, the differences in 
the number of children ever born followed the pattern of an inverse 
relationship. Similar conclusions can be made when the effects of 
marriage duration were removed. The only exception is in the group 
of women who were married for less than four years. It should be 
noted that the number of college educated women in the sample is 
too small to draw any significant conclusions. 
Husband's Education 
Fertility is also related to the education of the husband in 
Tables 11 and 12 which show the mean number of children ever born 
to wives of household heads according to the number of years of 
schooling attained by their husbands. Table 11 shows that, where 
the number of cases were large enough to calculate the means, 
there is an inverse relationship between husband's education and 
fertility in all age groups. It should be noted that the number 
of women aged 15-19 and women whose husbands had no formal educa- 
tion represented only a small proportion of respondents. Therefore 
the means are not presented for detailed classification of educa- 
tional levels among women aged 15-19 years and for age categories 
of women whose husbands had no formal education. 
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Table 11. Number of Children Ever Born by Husband's Education by Age 
* 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
* 

















No Education * * * * S * 
Primary * i.k 2.0 3.5 ¿4.0 ¿4.8 6.k 3.3 
Secondary * 0.9 1.5 2.6 3.6 k.k 6.7 3.0 
College * * 1.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 
* 1.7 
Total 1.0 12 1.9 3.1 3.7 +,k 6.3 3.2 





Ages 0-3 k-6 7-9 10-12 13+ 
No Education * * * * * 5.1 
Primary 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.9 Lf9 3.3 
Secondary 0.8 1.6 2.2 2.7 k.9 3.0 
College 0.7 1.6 * 2.7 2.k 1.7 
Total 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.9 ¿4.9 3.2 
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A similar inverse relationship between husband's education 
and fertility can be identified in Table 12. It can be seen that, 
when the effect of marriage duration was controlled, fertility in 
most groups declined with rising educational attainment. The only 
exception is in the marriage cohort of 4 to 6 years, where the same 
level of fertility persisted. 
Wife' s Occupation 
Occupation has been a prominent variable in both theoretical 
considerations and empirical investigations of fertility behavior. 
It is interesting therefore to examine the fertility differentials 
in occupation. 
Table 13 presents the mean number of children ever born by 
occupation and age. In general, it can be seen that women who worked 
in agricultural related occupations had the highest fertility (3.7). 
Women who were merchants (3.4) and those who were employed as unskilled 
labor (3.5) seem also to have high fertility. Among the wives who 
participated in the labor force, those who worked for the government 
had the lowest level of fertility (2.2). Table 14 shows the mean 
number of children ever born by occupation and duration of marriage. 
An interpretation of the results from this table is similar to that 
derived from Table 13. In all marriage durations, women from the 
farming families had more children than women from other occupations. 
Husband's Occupation 
Table 15 and Table 16 present the mean number of children ever 
born to wives of household heads according to their husband's occu- 
pation after the effects of the variations on age and marriage 
duration were controlled. It can be seen that, where data were 
available for comparison, while there are fertility differences for 
all age groups the differences are not pronounced among the young 
wives. The differences are most pronounced when we consider fer- 
tility in the oldest age cohort who has completed fertility. 
* 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
* 
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Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 


















Government * 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.2 3.8 * 2.2 
Agriculture * 1.5 2.3 3.6 4.1 5.0 8.0 3.7 
Trade * * 1.2 2.7 3.5 Li..8 4.8 3.4 
Skilled& 
Semi-skilled 
t * * * * * * 2.7 
Unskilled * t t * * * 6.6 3.5 
Housewife 1.1 1.8 3.1 * * 2.2 
Total 1.0 1.2 1.9 3.1 3.7 4.4 6.3 3.2 
Table 1k. Number of Children Ever Born by Respondent's Occupation by 
Marriage Duration 
Occupation 
Marriage Duration All 
Ages 0-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13+ 
Government 0.8 1.7 2.0 * 3.8 2.2 
Agriculture 1.3 1.5 2.2 3.2 5.3 3.7 
Trade 0.6 1.8 2.0 3.1 4.6 3.4 
Skilled & 
Semi-skilled 
t t * * 4.1 2.7 
Unskilled * t t 5.0 3.5 
Housewife 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.2 5.6 2.2 
Total 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.9 4.9 3.2 
* 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
* 
3k 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 

















Government * 0.9 1.6 2.9 3.0 k.l 5.5 2.6 
Agriculture * 1.5 2.3 3.0 +.2 5.6 7.5 3.7 
Trade * * 1.3 2.9 3.5 * * 2.6 
Skilled & 
Semi-skilled 
* * 1.8 2.1+ * * * 2.7 
Unskilled * 1.0 1.7 1+.3 3.8 k.i 7.0 3.3 
Unemployed 
or Deceased 
* * * * * 3.6 * 3.1+ 
Total 1.0 1.2 1.9 3.1 3.7 k.4 6.3 3.2 
Table 16. Number of Children Ever Born by Husband's Occupation by 
Marriage Duration 
Occupation 
Marriage Duration All 
Ages O-3 +-6 7-9 10-12 13+ 
Government 0.8 1.8 1.9 3.0 ¡+.7 2.6 
Agriculture 1.3 1.1+ 2.2 3.3 5.3 3.7 
Trade * * * 2.9 3.2 2.6 
Skilled & 
Semi-skilled 
* 1.1+ 1.8 t t 2.7 
Unskilled 0.8 1.6 * 2.3 5.3 3.3 
Unemployed 
or Deceased 
* t * k.6 3.1+ 
Total 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.9 k.9 3.2 
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Similarly, fertility differences by occupation are most striking 
only among the group of those who were married for 13 years or more1 
Comparison of the most and least fertile groups found a difference of 
approximately 1+0 percent between those wives from farming families 
and those whose husbands were merchants or sales personnel. 
Income 
Fertility differentials in income were analyzed and the results 
are presented in Tables 17 and 18. Without controlling for the effects 
of age and marriage duration, there is an indication of an inverse 
relationship between monthly family income and fertility. Women whose 
family income was below 1,000 Baht per month showed the highest curnu- 
lative fertility (3.6). With the increases of family income the 
levels of cumulative fertility declined to the lowest of 2.7 among 
those who earned more than 3,000 Baht a month. 
However, when the effects of age were considered, the relation- 
ship between monthly income and fertility is irregular in two age 
groups--25 to 29 and 'i0-k+. The results here indicate an interaction 
effect between income and age which may need further examination. 
0f equal interest is the relationship between income and fer- 
tility, controlling for marriage duration. It was found that the 
relationship was irregular when marriage duration was controlled. 
Except for those who were married for more than 13 years, it is 
possible that women whose family income was between 2,000 and 2,999 
Baht per month wanted more children than other income groups. Par- 
ticular caution, however, is required when interpreting differentials 
in cumulative fertility according to current income (characteristics) 
of the family. Cumulative fertility is a product of a number of 
years in the past, whereas family income may be current and not the 
level the family earned before. Therefore it is still in doubt that 




Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 
* 
Number of cases are too few to warrant a calculation of reliable mean. 


















Below 1,000 * 1.6 1.7 2.9 4.9 4.1 7.2 3.6 
1,000-1,999 * 1.0 1.8 3.8 3.8 5.]. 7.4 3.3 
2,000-2,999 * 1.2 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 6.4 3.2 
3,000+ * 1.1 1.8 2.3 3.0 4.5 5.]. 2.7 
Total 1.0 1.2 1.9 3.]. 3.7 4.4 6.3 3.2 
Table i8. Number of Children Ever Born by Income by Marriage Duration 
Income Marriage Duration All Ages 0-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13+ 
Below 1,000 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.5 5.3 3.6 
1,000-1,999 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.8 5.3 3.3 
2,000-2,999 * 1.5 2.+ 3.8 4.0 3.2 
3,000 0.8 1.6 2.1 2.8 4.5 2.7 
Total 0.9 1.6 2.7 2.9 4.9 3.2 
Family Size Planning 
Women in the sample were asked if they had ever thought before 
they were married of how many children they wanted. Approximately 
68 percent of them replied affirmatively. For those who gave an 
affirmative answer, another question designed to solicit the planned 
number was asked. Their answers were analyzed and it was found that 
about Lf2 percent of the group wanted no more than 2 children, and 
about 51 percent wanted between 3-+ children. The results indicate 
that more than half of the Thai women still had a large ideal family 
size. Their ideal family size was above the replacement level of 2. 
Therefore, it is important, if Thailand wants to reduce the popula- 
tion growth to the replacement level, to campaign for the smaller 
ideal family size among Thai women. 
Interestingly, however, it was found that the fertility of 
those who had thought about some kinds of family size planning was 
lower than those who had no notion of choosing an ideal size. The 
average number of children ever born for the former was 3.0, as 
compared to 3.6 for the latter. This indicates that the former 
group must have really practiced some contraception. 
Contraceptive Use 
Probably the most important intermediate variable described 
by Davis and Blake (1956) in terms of accounting for the differences 
in the fertility of economically less developed and economically 
advanced countries is the use or non-use of contraception. With 
the significance of contraceptive use, we have collected data both 
on ever use and current use of contraception. The results for 
ever use status and methods used are presented in Table 19. About 
76.4 percent of the ever-married women aged 15-49 interviewed in 
the study had practised contraception. 
Table 19 shows that the pill was the most widely used con- 
traveptive method. Almost 48 percent of ever married women 
reported that they had used the pill. Almost 19 percent of ever 
married women indicated that they had been sterilized, while only 




Interestingly enough, about 6.2 percent of the women in our 
study indicated that they had had some induced abortions before. 
This is an indication that when they had some method failures and 
unplanned pregnancies they resorted to abortion, which can be 
interpreted that most births which occurred in marriage were not 
just random. Most Thai women had thought in advance about family 
building and family size before they practiced any contraception. 
Therefore their fertility decision must be of particular interest 
to demographers. 




Pill Condom IUD Sterili- Sterili- Other 
tion 
zation zation 
Ever 76.1+ '+7.9 1.3 1.3 18.7 0.3 6.2 0.6 
Never 23.6 
With regard to the level of current use of contraception, we 
found that there was almost no difference in the level of contraceptive 
use. A decline of approximately 6 percent in the level of contraceptive 
use was noted. This difference was clearly attributed to the elimina- 
tion of abortion as a legitimate method for current use. Comparison 
of data of ever use status with that of current use indicates that the 




Intention to Have Another Child 
As a rough measure to see whether Thai women had made any 
calculated fertility decision, they were asked if they wanted 
another child. This question was asked because we believe that 
humans always make a choice when they have several alternatives. 
Having one child, or an additional child is no exception. Couples 
can almost always plan and choose the time to have another child 
well in advance before the birth actually comes. 
The data from the responses to the question indicate that 
only 1 out of 305 respondents abeolutely could not make any 
fertility decieion. Among the women who could express a decision 
for having another child, 62 percent did not want to have any more 
children; only 38 percent did. For those who wanted more children, 
they were asked how soon they wanted to have another child. Their 
responses show that about 22 percent wanted to have their next 
child soon: 11 percent before the next year, 19 percent within the 
next year and 25 percent within the next 2 or 3 years. We also 
noted that 12 percent of the respondents in this group could not 
have any more children due to health reasons. Interestingly, by 
asking the question about the time the respondents actually plan 
to have another child, we were able to differentiate those who 
could not make plan and make a decision on fertility from the 
group who earlier expressed the desire to have another child. 
Approximately 9 percent of the respondents in the group or about 
3 percent of the total sample did not really know when they wanted 
another child. This group of persons was only partially able to 
make their fertility decisions. Therefore, it is estimated that 
about 97 percent of Thai women were able absolutely to make their 
fertility decision. To them, having a child was never a random 
and unplanned event. 
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Another question was asked to get at the desired number of 
additional children. It was found that 71+ percent wanted to have 
one more, i8 percent 2 more, 6 percent 3 more and about 2 percent 
more. The answers to this question indicated that most of the 
women in this group wanted to have only one more child. 
On the average this group of women wanted 1.1+ more children. 
But when a mean of desired additional children was calculated for 
the whole sample the average was 0.5. It is expected, therefore, 
that by the time this group of women complete their fertility they 
would have an average total of 3.7 children per family. 
The results from our analysis have clearly indicated that 
Thai women not only could decide whether they actually wanted any 
more children, but they could also choose the time and the number 
they wanted. 
Sources of Influence in Fertility Decision 
The decision to have children may be influenced by the opinion 
of several people. A woman's ideal number of children may also be 
shaped by the opinion of people whom she perceived as significant 
for her. In an attempt to identify the source of influence in the 
decisions to have a child (or children) women in the sample were 
asked to identify the persons whom they perceived as having influence 
in their decisions. Table 20 shows that relatives were one of the 
most important groups of persons that wc*nen most frequently consulted 
and talked with. Through close interactions with relatives, they 
were able to discuss the intimate and more personal issues, such as 
how many children one should have. However, since the classification 
of relatives included close relationships from siblings to more dis- 
tant relationships such as aunt or uncle, we found the reported ideal 
number of children for the category very heterogeneous and more 
speculative than actual. Most respondents in the group could only 
give an answer on the perceived ideal number in terms of "many" or "few," 
not being specific in number. Interestingly, we found that the 
proportions who gave the answer either "many" or "few" were not 
significantly statistically different. This suggests that while 
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relatives were reported as important on the matter of making the 
decision for having or not having children, their influences in 
the ideal number of children may be rather random, and the positive 
and negative effects on fertility may cancel each other. 
Of almost equal importance in the mind of the women were 
friends and neighbors. About 3k percent of the women interviewed 
reported that they used to talk with close friends and neighbors 
on the matter of how many children one should have. The consensus 
of opinion of friends as reported by the respondents was that one 
should not have too many children to the point that it would make 
it difficult to bring up quality children. The normative number 
for the close friends and neighbors was a family of 3.0 children-- 
a figure which is interestingly close to the actual average number 
of children ever born of 3.2 for the respondents. Therefore it is 
apparent that a large proportion of women in the sample took the 
opinion of their friends and neighbors seriously in deciding on 
the number of children they should have. 
While the husband's opinion is expected to have a significant 
impact on the decisions of the wife, the proportion of respondents 
who placed their husbands as the most influential person on her 
decision to have children represented only 2k.3 percent. It should 
be noted here that the figure presented was derived from the first 
answer to the question. There were several people who listed more 
than one persons whom they perceived as having some influence on 
their decisions. A considerable proportion of respondents mentioned 
husband in their second answer. The interaction between husband 
and wife therefore is important and will be explored and discussed 
again in the next section. 
Table 20. Person Having Influence in Fertility Decision 
It is interesting also to find that only 2.9 percent of the 
respondents reported parents as having some influence on their 
decisions. This figure seems to be lower than what we expected. 
However, when we analyzed the answers from the depth interviews of 
respondents on the interaction between married couples and parents 
we had interesting findings. We found a larger proportion of wives 
who admitted that they had talked with their parents on the size of 
family they should be building. In fact, they were even encouraged 
to observe the ideal number conveyed to them. 
Among approximately 68 percent of the wives who ever talked 
with their parents on the topic of ideal number of children, the 
average parents' ideal number of children as reported by the 
respondents, after excluding those who did not know the exact 
number, was 3.3. This figure is also close to the actual fertility 
of 3.2 children of the wives. 
Person Frequency Percentage 
Relative 37 ¿4 
Friend & neighbor 3Lf .1 
Husband 71f 2L4.3 
Parents 9 2.9 
None (self) ¿f 1.3 
Total 305 100 O 
¿f3 
With the intention of comparing the ideal number of children 
of the wives' parents with those of the husbands' parents, we also 
asked the respondents if they knew how many children their husbands' 
parents wanted them to have. About 3'pemcent of the respondents 
were able to give the exact number; and 11 percent were only able 
to judge the parents' desired number in terms of few or many. A 
calculation of mean ideal number of children, after excluding those 
who could not give a specific number, found a slightly higher level 
at 3,14.. Since the difference. was small it seems uncertain whether 
the husbands' parents really wanted more grandchildren than the 
wives' parents Further research in this area is needed before we 
can have any more definitive evidence of parents' ideal number and 
its influence on the married couple's decisions. 
After noting all the influential persons, there remained only 
1.3 percent of the wives who decided on their own. For this small 
group of persons, the decision to have children means that each 
individual must be responsible and bear any costs entailed in the 
raising. The individual, therefore, should not let someone else 
decide the matter for them. 
After giving all the sources of influence, an observation 
can be made that when grouping relatives, husbands and parents 
together, we can see that the dominant influencing entity lies 
chiefly in the family institution. While family structure does 
not explain fertility differen.ti&.s ii-n the types -0.1 fam.ly 
(Kamnuansilpa and Ragthaidee, 1977), the family institution in 
itsI is still significant in serving as a structural source of 
influence in the decisions regarding birth and size of children. 
This suggests that the patterns of interaction among family members 
are more important to look at than merely the coresidency. If 
coresidency has any effect on fertility decisions, it is only 
mediated by a closer interaction among family members. 
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Husband and Wife Communication 
The study of fertility decision cannot be conducted without 
looking at the extent of husband and wife communication on the 
topic of birth planning and ideal size of family. Rainwater and 
Weinstein (1960) found from a study of the marital relations of 
95 lower class white couples in Chicago and Cincinnati that couples 
who frequently communicated to each other on the subject of ideal 
family size and other family affairs were among the higher propor- 
tion who practiced contraception. In addition, they were more 
effective in the way they used contraception. 
In our study we also investigated the extent of communication 
between husband and wife on contraceptive behaviors. Respondents 
ïn our sample were asked to indicate the subject they most frequently 
talked about with their husbands. The responses to this question 
revealed that the subject the couples most frequently talked about 
was economic in nature. About 70 percent of them discussed ways to 
make a living, which included occupational opportunities, incomes 
and so on. Still, approximately another 16 percent of the couples 
conversed quite often on what to do to raise their own standards of 
living and ways to become affluent. These two types of answers 
represented almost 80 percent of the total responses. Therefore 
family economic well-being was the topic of utmost concern among 
most Thai married couples. 
Almost discussed by one-tenth of the couples was the future 
and educational opportunity of children. But in fact the discussions 
of educational opportunity could not be made without any economic 
consideration. The rest of the respondents, about 10 percent, 
reported various other types of discussion. What is worth mention- 
ing is that only about 1 percent indicated family planning as the 




Since one of our prime concerns in exploring the extent of 
communication among the married couples was the subject of birth 
planning, interviewers were instructed to investigate communication 
between husband and wife on the use of contraception. After being 
questioned, 78 percent of respondents reported that they ever 
discussed more than once with their own husband the topic of 
family planning (see Table 21). 
Table 21. Proportion of Wives Who Had Ever Communicated With 
Husband on Family Size and Number of Children Desired 
Number Desired All 





Interestingly, we found that the communication among these 
couples went further, even to the point where they included ideal 
family size ae the topic of discusaion. We can see from Table 21 
that 61.7 percent of these couples wanted between 2 or 3 children. 
The mean ideal number of children for them was 3.2, compared with 
their actual fertility of 3.0 children. The small difference here 
indicates that most of the married couples were able to attain 
their ideal number of children; also there were some women who 
would have additional children before they would complete their 
families. All this information put together implies that women 
in Thailand were able to control their fertility, thus having 
children by choice and not by chance. 
(%) 78.0 3.k 3k.8 26.9 19.3 6.3 7.6 1.7 100.0 
(ri) 238 8 83 6k k6 15 i8 k 238 
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Women who ever communicated with their husbands on the 
subject of birth planning and ideal size of family were also 
asked if they knew of their husbands' reason for choosing a 
specific family size. The responses presented in Table 22 show 
that more than half (51.3%) of the wives gave ecrnomic considera- 
tion as their ¡nain reason. Their ideal size of chïldren was 
judged and formulated on the basis of their income levels and 
costs of raising children. Therefore, most couples agreed with 
the normative value that one should not have more children than 
one canreally afford in order to bring up quality children. 
About 10 percent of the husbands considered the ideal number 
of children on the basis of security in old age. This group of 
husbands wanted to have enough children around so that there would 
be someone to take care of them when they become too old to take 
care of themselves. This group of respondents tended to desire 
more children than the former group. 
There is still the third category of responses. Almost 30 
percent of the wives considered the ideal number of children from 
the perspective of appropriate size--neither too large nor too 
small; and there were no other reasons. 
Table 22. usband's Reason for Wanting a Specified Number of 
Children 
Reason Frequency Percentage 
Economic 122 51.5 
Security in old age 2+ 10.1 
Meet ideal number 70 29..k 
Health 3 1.3 
Don't know 19 7.9 
Total 238 100.0 
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Health reasons represented only about 1 percent of the 
responses. Wives in this group were no longer able to have any 
more children. There were about 8 percent of the wives who did 
not know their husbands' reason for wanting a specified number 
of children. It is suspected that there might be some dege of 
communication barrier among them that somehow made it very dif fi- 
cult for wives to know their husbands' reasons, or simply that 
their communication might not have been extensive enough to allow 
them to consider the reasons for choosing a specified number. 
The investigation of husband and wife communication was 
also aimed at measuring the extent to which the couples shared 
the saine ideal number of children. Interestingly, approximately 
l percent of the wives who reported having communication with 
their husbands had a different ideal number of children from 
their husbands, with about 3 percent wanting more and li percent 
wanting less children. 
When asked for the reasons, we found that the wives who had 
the large ideal family size wanted more children because of 
psychological reasons. A large family for them would provide 
psychological gratification, such as companionship and love. 
Those who preferred a small family judged it on the basis of 
the financial costs of rearing quality children and on the 
precariousness to one's health from having too many children. 
Advant:es and Diaadvanta:es of Havin: Man Children 
During the interview respondents were asked an open ended 
question to elicit the responses on the advantages and disadvantages 
of having many children, defined as three or more. Table 23 shows 
that the most frequently mentioned advantage of having many 
children is help in economic activities. Women whose responses 
were classified into this category perceived that children pro- 
vided economic benefits to parents, among thsrn were the sharing 
of financial responsibility when children are employed, the 
assistance in the family business or farm, and general economic 
help. The second most frequently mentioned advantage is security 
and care in old age. Almost 25 percent of the wives perceived 
that children were their source of economic security and care in 
old age. Still a much smaller number of wives mentioned the 
advantages of children in terms of household help and unspecified 
help. These three categories of responses represented about 72 
percent of the married women. Therefore we can say that about 
72 percent of women perceived the advantages of having a large 
number of children in terms of economic utility. 
Psychological values of children were mentioned less fre- 
quently, only 8.8 percent. Companionship, happiness for the 
family, and love and affection associated with children were the 
prominant responses on the psychological advantages (7.2%). 
Only 1.6 percent saw the advantages in terms of sri increasing 
opportunity for the extension of self. To the women whose 
responses belonged to this category, children would be a source 
of hope for achievement and pride. Most notable was the verbal 
report that they hoped that whatever had not been accomplished 
in their life course would be pursued again in the life course 
of their children. In connection with this psychological value 
of children was the opinion that one of the happiest moments in 
life is the time when one can see the success of their children. 
There were a few who set the goal for several of the most presti- 
gious occupations (for example, doctor, lawyer and engineer) for 
their children to follow. Therefore, we can see that while 
economic advantages were the most frequent response, psychological 
advantages were also salient. 
After the respondents had mentioned all the advantages they 
could think of, they were asked to state what they considered to 
be the disadvantages of having a large number of children. Table 
2k indicates that the most salient disadvantage was the financial 
costs of children. While about k5 percent of the respondents 
mentioned general financial costs, almost the same proportion or 
about k3 percent mentioned more specifically the costs of educating 
children. These two types of responses were in fact similar in 
nature because both centered on the perceived economic costs of 
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Table 23. Advantages of Having a Large Number of Children 
Advantage Frequency Percentage 
Help in economic activities 1k3 '46.3 
Security and care in old age 75 2k.6 
Help in housework 2 0.7 
Companionship, avoidance of loneliness 22 7.2 
Extension of self 5 1.6 
None (No advantage) 52 17.0 
Don't know, no answer 6 2.0 
Total 305 100.0 
Table 2'4. Disadvantage of Having a Large Number of Children 
General financial costs 136 '4k.G 
Education Costs 132 '43.2 
Rearing Problems 6 2.0 
Obstacle for gainful employment 10 3.3 
Don't know, no answer 21 6.9 
Total 305 100.0 
Disadvantages Frequency Percentage 
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children. The difference is that educational costs were more likely 
to be mentioned by those whose income and educational attainment 
were above the group average. It should be noted here that the 
findings that financial costs were the most salient disadvantages 
confirms the results from the earlier study of The Value of Children 
in Thailand by Buripakdi (1977). 
Other disadvantages noted included rearing problems in general. 
According to the respondents, having many children requires a lot of 
time, effort and emotion for the rearing and disciplining of children. 
Also mentioned by approximately 3 percent of the women was the oppor-. 
tunity cost of having a large number of children. Children were per- 
ceived to create an obstacle for the gainful employment of the mother. 
Taking care of children is a full time job in itself, thus making it 
difficult for both husband and wife to take extradomiciliary work. 
Although servants or housemaids can be hired to help take care of 
children, such services have become expensive, and parents still 
cannot help worrying about childcare while at work. 
We have seen that the economic benefits and costs of children 
are salient to married women and presumably to their husbands, as 
well. It is expected therefore that couples will make conscious 
decisions about bearing children; those decisions should be based on 
their perceptions of the benefits to be derived from children 
weighted against the costs they expect children to entail. However, 
it is not suggested that couples make childbearing decisions entirely 
or perhaps even mainly, on the basis of economic factors. Child- 
bearing decisions are indeed complex and purely economic models of 
fertility cannot hope to capture all the elements involved in these 
decisions. More accurately, it should be concluded that in Thailand 
economic factors are an important, but not the only, component in 
family size decisions. Our interpretation of the effects of economic 
factors in the' fertility decisions here is consistent with that 
suggested in the study of Economic Factors in Family Size Decisions 
in Thi4and, by Arnold and Pejaranonda (1977). 
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Although we have documented the significance of economic 
factors in fertility decisions, it remains to be seen whether they 
are powerful enough to influence decisions about family planning 
and contraceptive use. Do women decide to practice contraception 
because of the costs of raising children and other economic con- 
straints? Aside from the economic consideration, are there any 
other factors which influence the decisions to adopt contraception? 
These questions are not easy to answer on the basis of the results 
of a single study, but partial conclusions can be drawn from an 
examination of the data in Tables 25 and 26 which give respectively 
the first and second reasons that led to the decision to adopt 
contraception. 
Comparing the results from the two tables allows us to detect 
whether there was more than one factor involved in the decision of 
the women. Approximately 75 percent of the respondents stated 
that their decision to limit the number of births was based mainly 
on one factor, which means that another 25 percent considered more 
than one factor. 
Among those who gave their first reason for the use of contra- 
ception, about 62 percent expressed the constraints of economic 
factors, as compared with almost 30 percent who considered social 
factors. Suggested as being outside the influences of economic 
and social factors, were about 7 percent of the married women who 
had to use contraception because their health conditions were 
poor, and who were advised by the physicians not to have any more 
children. Almost all of them wanted more children, but were not 
able to fulfil this desire. 
While more than half of the women who used contraception 
stated that their decision was based on the economic situation of 
their own family, nearly 87 percent of this group focused mainly 
on the costs of raising children; about 12 percent desired to 
devote their time more extensively to gainful employment and saw 
the incidence of having another child as an obstacle for it, or 
in some cases an obstacle for job advancement; others (approxi- 
mately 1 percent) wanted to limit their family size because of 
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Table 26. Second Reason for Practicing Contraception 
Reason Frequency Percentage 
Table 25. First Reason for Practicing Contraception 
Reason Frequency Percentage 
Economic 1k5 62.2 
Expenses (costs) 126 5Lf.Q 
Obstacle for Occupational 
Advancement 17 7.3 
Insecurity 2 0.9 
Social 69 29.6 
Education 19 8.2 
Group norms k8 20.6 
Other 2 0.8 
Health 16 6.9 
Don't know 3 1.3 
Total 233 100.0 
Economic 15 36.6 
Social 20 Lf8.8 
Health 6 ik.6 
Total La ioo.o 
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the couples' bleak economic outlook. The results here suggested 
that the costs of children judged by the majority of women out- 
weighted the utility factor. Perhaps it is suggested also that 
most married couples in Thailand considered that children would 
add more costs than income, either in cash or kind, to the 
families, thus making it necessary to limit the number of births. 
Interestingly enough, approximately three-tenths of the 
couples limited the number of their children because of social 
factors. Approximately 70 percent of this group used contraception 
because they were influenced by the norms of the social groups 
with whom they interact. These social groups include friends and 
neighbors, relatives and to a smaller extent, parents as well. 
While in fact the influence of these social groups may have already 
been counted and expressed in terms of economic rationality among 
the majority of the women who used contraception, a distinction 
here must be made that this is the group of women who wanted to 
have some specified number of children that were in accord with the 
ideal number of the groups. As interesting implication here is 
that we are seeing a study which points out that behavior in itself 
can affect attitudes. More specifically we are suggesting that the 
use of contraception now in Thailand has been prevalent enough to 
the point where one can think of the use of it, and thus having a 
small number of children, as a normative behavior. Those conforming 
with this group norm, by having a large number of children, would 
be deviant or simply just create a cognitive dissonance situation 
whereby their behavior would not be consistent with the individual's 
private perception of the society. 
Education, though classified as one component of the social 
factor, cannot be clearly separated from the economic factor. 
About 8 percent of the women wanted to limit their number of 
births because they wanted to send their already born children to 
one of the best schools to enable them to have the best education. 
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The desire for strong educational achievement by the children is 
reinforced through societal norms that encourage one not to have 
more children than one can afford to bring up as quality children. 
In addition, Thai society has a strong positive social value 
regarding education. A person who completes a high level of 
education is normally placed well above the average in the social 
strata. This is even more true in the rural areas than in urban 
communities. Therefore, there is a strong social pressure for 
parents to provide their children with the best education they 
can. There is, of course, the cost of educating the children 
involved; and this is, at least, one part in the decisIon-making 
process of women where economic and social factors intertwine. 
Further evidence of the multifactors involved in the 
decisions to regulate birth is interpreted in Table 26. Approxi- 
mately 18 percent of the women who used contraception reported that 
they had more than one reasons to limit their fertility. Among 
them, 36.6 percent mentioned economic factors, '+8.8 percent men- 
tioned social factors and 11+.6 mentioned health effects from being 
pregnant too frequently. It is interesting that a higher percentage 
of women mentioned social factors than those who mentioned economic 
factors in the answer for the second reason. Thus it suggests 
that while economic consideration may come at first thought, the 
social aspects of having children are more or less equally important. 
Women who did not use contraception were also asked for the 
reasons. Among the 72 cases of the women who were in this group, 
18 percent reported that they were afraid that the use of contra- 
ception would have some side effects or negative effects on their 
health, 13.9 percent wanted to use it but were unable to get 
access to it, 23.6 percent had no need for it because of sub- 
fecundity or temporary separation from the spouse, and 37.5 percent 
of them still wanted more children. Women in the latter group were 
probed to investigate whether their desire for more progenies was 
based on the perceived economic uttltty- of children. It was 
found that most of them wanted more children because they were 
quite young wives who were newly married and had not yet been able 
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Table 27. Reason for Not Practicing Contraception 
to attain their ideal number of children. Only a few persons 
already had more than three children. When asked the reason for 
wanting more children, their answers varied, but the most 
interesting answer was that children were seen as a source of 
security in old age and at other times of need. This kind of 
answer was referred to by some demographers as the "pension 
motive" for having children. Neher (1971), for example, believed 
that the pension motive was a major motive for having children in 
primitive societies. With the lack of pensions, social security, 
unemployment compensation, and other insurance schemes, children 
served as the only reliable source of security for their parents, 
particularly in old age. The strength of this motive, however, 
was still debatable. Hohm (1975) showed that social security 
programs had a negative effect on subsequent levels of fertility 
in a large number of countries. However, bctii Robinson (1972) 
and Ohiin (1969) believed that, empirically, children were not a 
good investment for old age. While we believe that, judging in 
terms of monetary return, children may be a poor investment, we 
are also of the opinion that monetary support is, of course, not 
Reason Frequency Percentage 
Side effects 13 18.0 
Not accessible 10 13.9 
Want more children 27 37.5 
Sub fecund 17 23.6 
Separation from spouse 3 
Don't know (no responses) 2 2.8 
Total 72 100.0 
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the only thing parents need in old age. Physical and emotional 
supports may be just as important and they are often extricably 
intertwined with purely financial considerations. Therefore the 
perception of children as a source of security in old age and at 
other times of need is of particular interest to us. 
We have found, therefore, that married couples do not per- 
ceive of economic utility as a linear function. Within a range 
of certain numbers, children are believed to have economic utility; 
after that range, children may be perceived as a disutility. A 
more appropriate way to investigate the significance of the pension 
motive is to ask a question on the purpose or advantage of having 
children in general, compared with not having children at all. We 
found that after asking the question, 30.8 percent of the total 
sample mentioned one or more types of security in old age. These 
included economic help, companionship, comfort, and unspecified 
help in old age. By asking for the advantage of having children 
in general, we found an increase in the number of women (6.2 per- 
cent) who saw the significance of children in old age. This 
increase was attributed to the ways in which questions were asked, 
that is, having children in general as compared to simply having 
a large number of children. Undoubtedly, many women were able to 
discern the disutility or costs of having a large number of children 
now from future old age returns or benefits. 
Other evidence of the way the answer is affected by the way 
the question is phrased is seen in this example. The respondents 
were asked if they agreed with the statement that one of the 
advantages of having children (in general) is that it ensures the 
parents that there will be someone around to take care of them in 
their old age. The responses to this statement found 86.6 percent 
of the women strongly agreed, 5.2 percent agreed, 5.6 percent 
agreed alittle, 0.7 percent disagreed, and 2.0 percent strongly 
disagreed. With these results, we can see that most women did 
perceive of children as the source of security in old age. While 
this this is true, we need to be cautious and not over-generalize 
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that most married couples have children because they perceive 
children as the source of security in old age. Judging from the 
way the responses varied with the way questions were asked, it is 
more correct that couples did not base their decisions to have 
children entirely on the pension motive1 but on several interwoven 
factors. Children as a security source in old age, in this case, 
may very well serve as a psychological benefit also, not just 
purely as a social and economic return. Faced with the reality 
that one has to make a living, economic elements are more obvious 
than social and psychological elements. Beneath the economic 
layer lies the social and psychological concerns at deeper and 
less conscious levels. Thus, only when the question was asked in 
a sufficiently stimulating manner did the answer reveal the psycho- 
logical aspects of need for security, especially in old age. 
Children to us, as to the women in our sample, are perceived to be 
one of the security sources that one can hope to rely on. There- 
fore, it is only in the thinking process that women tend to consider 
the economic need first. Thus, this economic realization is the 
primary one, followed by the social and psychological gratifications 
for having children. 
Mean Number of Children Desired Under Certain Conditions 
We have already looked at the decisions of having children 
in the context of economic, social and psychological benefits. 
Now we will look at certain fertility depressing conditions. 
These conditions were introduced to the women as some criteria for 
evaluating or responding in terms of their hypothetical, rather 
than actual, fertility behaviors. Six conditions, as listed in 
Table 28, were introduced or mentioned to women in the sample. 
The responses indicated that these six conditions did have, at 
varying degrees, some fertility depressing effects, 
Conditions 
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Table 28. Mean Number of Children Desired Under Certain Conditions 
Mean 
Number 
When asked what would be the right number of children 
according to their financial budget, the mean number of children 
desired was 2.8, about 12.5 percent lower than the actual fertility 
of 3.2 children. This indicates that in actuality, while financial 
costs of children tend to reduce fertility, the effect was lower 
than the potential by 12.5 percent. Thus, other factors were 
operating in the opposite direction, as already has been mentioned, 
in terms of benefits of various kinds. Nevertheless, the implica- 
tion for married women is that they considered their actual ferti- 
lity exceeded the ideal number by 12 percent, and this excessive 
fertility might have already created some tight budgeting situations 
in the family. 
Would be the right number of children for your 
financial budget. 2.8 
Would be the maximum number of children for you 
to give a good education. 2.3 
Would be the maximum number of children you 
could have that would still leave you time 2.5 
for social interests. 
Would be the right number for you to give 
enough time and attention br the children. 2.7 
Would be the right number for you to give 
children enough companionship. 2.9 
Would be the right number to strengthen the 
husband-wi fe relationship. 2.8 
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The responses to the question of what would be the maximum 
number of children taking into account the desire to give them a 
good education, found even more fertility depressing effects 
regarding these costs (construed as one way of bringing up quality 
children), as compared to budget constraints for general costs of 
children. The mean number of children desired by married women 
was only 2.3, a figure which is close to the replacement level of 
2.1. The result here is consistent with the normative expectation 
that parents should give their children a good education. One way 
of achieving this is by reducing the total costs through reducing 
the number of children. 
The first two conditions more or less had to do with the 
costs of children. Turning to social interests, we found that 
the average maximum number of children the married women considered 
would still leave them enough time for social activities, was 2.5, 
This figure is also quite low. Therefore it implies that having 
a large number of children creates a conflict with social activities. 
Women who had more children might unavoidably have to cut down some 
social activities, in order to avoid conflicts. 
Closely related to this situation is the question of the 
right number of children to whom the mother can give enough time 
and attention. Women in our sample indicated that 2.7 would be 
the right number. This fourth condition has more to do with 
physical work and attention, than any conflict with social 
engagements 
Society expects the mother to give sufficient attention as 
well as companionship to the children. Since we assumed that 
human behaviors are more or less influenced by societal norms, 
we asked the mothers what would be the right number for them to 
still give their children enough companionship. The average 
number was 2.9. This is the highest average we received, which 
implies that mothers did already give almost all the companion- 
ship and affection they could to their children, and they could 
not see how they could give more. 
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The last thing we looked at was the husband and wife 
relationship. In Thai society, children are considered a golden 
chain that binds the husband and wife together, thus rengthening 
the conjugal relationship. At the same time there is a saying 
that having a child makes a couple poor for at least ten years, 
since it is normally expected that a poor economic situation or 
more specifically a financial problem in the family, undermines 
the family relationship. It was of particular interest to ask 
the wives the right number of children the couples should have in 
order to strengthen the husband-wife relationship. The answer to 
this question alone found an average of 2.8 children, which implies 
that, in the mind of the respondents, having as many as three or 
more children may not necessarily strengthen the conjugal relation- 
ship. In this case having the first or second child may have 
already strengthened the bond between husband and wife. A higher 
order of births, therefore, would not have any more effect. Also 
there is an implication that, through less costs entailed, a small 
family size may in fact sustain the relationship of the married 
couples better than a large one. 
We have seen how women have reacted to six different situa- 
tions. In the differences of the number of children there is one 
similarity, that is all women considered low fertility as more 
compatible to the hypothetical conditions suggested to them. The 
results in this part also implicate, if not substantiate, that 
the decision to have a small or large family can be influenced 
simultaneously by several different things. The outcome of actual 
fertility or the number of children one has is perhaps the result 
of careful deliberation. And it is suggested, also, that human 
beings often have to make a choice among several alternatives: 
children versus other amenities. 
6]. 
Individual Modernity and Fertility Decision 
Recent development in the micro].evel studies of ferti3ity- 
related behaviors have pervaded the area of individual modernity. 
Evidences for a long-term inverse relationship between rnoderniza- 
tion and fertility were found and explained in terms of economic 
and socia]. change connected with economic development (see, e.g., 
Notestein, 1953). This process of modernization is broad and it 
includes at the macroscopic level, for example, changes in the 
direction of lower mortality, particularly low infant and child 
mortality, more industrialized, more urbanized, more improved in 
education levels and systems, higher standards of living, higher 
costs of child rearing and higher degrees of social mobility and 
striving for achievement. Modernization also brings changes in 
the ways in which individuals may perceive, interpret, or react 
to their immediate social setting, with special reference to the 
consequences for family size preferences, contraceptive and 
fertility behaviors. For the purpose of our study we will move 
away from the societal-level variables of modernization, such as 
levels of literacy or education, average per capita income, 
proportion of population living in urban areas, number of radios 
or newspaper circulated and so on and focus on the micro level 
of individual modernity. 
Individual modernity or modernism is broadly perceived as 
a pattern of psychological characteristics related to societal 
modernization. More specifically, it refers to a set of doctrines, 
or a set of attitudes, values or beliefs, ways of feelings and 
acting, associated with the modern state. By contrast, tradi- 
tionalism is the comparable set for the traditional state. Such 
internalized sets of attitudes and beliefs are generally held to 
be the results of social change forced upon the individual. The 
individual in turn, through these internalized cognitive sets, 
acts upon social change, either to hamper or to facilitate. 
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Thus, these psychological modal characteristics inevitably exert 
a pervasive influence on the individual's decisions in related 
matters--in this case, fertility. Different studies on modernïza- 
tion focus upon different dimensions of modernity. Most studies, 
however, did not originally give particular attention to fertility. 
The underlying rationale of individual modernity studies is 
that exposure to uniformities in the immediate social and physical 
environment will result in uniformities in certain behaviors and 
psychological characteristics or traits (Fawcett, 1970). With 
this underlying rationale a number of social psychologi6ts have 
worked on the ways to measure individual modernity. Their works 
have proved to be significant. 
In our attempt to measure individual modernity, 12 atti- 
tdiria1 items were derived in direct or modified form from the 
following authoritative eources: 0M-6 Modernity Scale (Smith 
and Inkeles, 1966); The Chinese Traditional Western (T-w) Scale 
(Dawson, Law, Leung and Whitney, 1971); Modernism I and II (Kahi, 
1968); The Filipino Traditional and Modern-Attitudinal Scale 
(Guthrie, 1970). The items employed in this study were selected 
on the basis that they were previously tested to have predicted 
power. 
Detailed literature on modernization arid the measurements 
of modernity can be referred to elsewhere (Fawcett, 1973; Fawcett, 
1970; Freedman, 1963; Hawthorn, 1970; Inkeles and Smith, 19?Lf). 
For the purpose of the present study, which did not intend to 
develop a measurement instrument, it suffices to apply some of 
the previously developed scales. Most of the major dimensions 
of modernity, particularly the fertility-related dimensions, 
were used to determine individual modernity of the Thai subjects 




Status of male and female 
(k) Fatalism or low stratification of life chance 
Openness to experience and change 
Integration with relatives 
Faith in science and technology. 
All 12 selected items (see Table 29) were presented in a 
four-point Likert format scale: agree very much, agree a little, 
disagree a little and disagree very much. Responses on the scale 
were converted into scores ranging from 1 to 4 with high scores 
given to responses which indicated a modern attitude. The total 
possible scores an individual could receive fell between 12 and 
48 points, with high points reflecting modernism and low points 
indicating traditionalism. The mean score of the individual 
modernity attitudinal questionnaires as earned by this sample of 
Thai women was 20.5. This average score indicates that the Thai 
women were more traditional than modern, since their mean score 
was below 30, the average score for a neutral point. 
Since the average score of the Thai women in our sample 
skewed toward the traditional side, and we also found (as indi- 
cated in Table 29) that the mean score for each item was between 
1.16 and 2.9k, none of which reached 3.0, we decided to look at 
the relationship between individual modernity and fertility in a 
somewhat crude fashion and to move away from a direct use of the 
raw score of each individual. Instead, we dichotomized the 
respondents into those who scored above the mean of 20.5 and those 
below the mean. By dichotomization we were able to see more 
clearly how individual modernity is related to fertility. There 
was evidence that the individual modernity score is negatively 
correlated with fertility. That is to say that women who were 
more modern in attitude tended to have lower fertility than 
those who were more traditional. On the average, a woman who 
6k 





1. Man cannot be good without religion l.LiO .85 
2. FAMILY MODERNISM 
A good wife should obey her husband 1.38 .70 
If a husband and wife are unhappy together, 
it is better to divorce. 2.71 1.35 
k. A good child should not argue with or talk 
back to the elders. i.kO .87 
A child should obey his parents even when 
he thinks they are wrong. 2.18 1.30 
Divorce brings disgrace to the family and 
relatives. 1.68 1.17 
3. STATUS 0F THE MALE AND FEMALE 
7. Men, by nature, are more intelligent and 
competent than women. 1.78 1.13 
8. It is reasonable that women receive lower 
pay than men for the same kind of work. 1.99 1.28 
k. FATALISM 
9. Men are born with unequal "Wasana" 
(close equivalent to destiny) 1.16 .53 
5. OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE AND CHANGE 
10. Customs and traditions should not be 
changed at aU. 1.33 .82 
6. INTEGRATION WITH RELATIVES 
11. One should always consider the opinion 
of relatives and significant others in 
making decisions. 1.79 1.11 
7. FAITH IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
12. Between the doctor and old people.-- 
sometimes old people understand illness best. 2.9k 1.23 
Note: Item sources: 
Item 1, 8 and 11 from D.H. Smith and A. Inkeles (1966). 
Items 2 and 3 from J.A. Kahi (1968). 
Items k, 5 and 12 from G.M. Guthrie (1970). 
Item 7 from Dawson, Law, Leung, & Whitney (1971). 
Items 6, 9 and 10 modified from several studies on 
Thai culture. 
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was placed above the group average in the individual modernity had 
only 2.8 children, as compared with 3.5 for one who was below 
average. This difference of 25 percent is clearly significant at 
0.02 level by the t-test method. Furthermore we found that indivi- 
duals who were more modern were more likely to use contraceptives. 
This part of the finding is consistent with the results on the 
fertility behavior. 
After looking at the overt fertility behavior, it may be of 
particular interest to look at the reasons given on fertility 
decision related questions.. When asked the reason for practicing 
contraception, we found an interesting pattern of responses. 
Individuals who were above average in the modernity score had a 
slight tendency to think more of social and psychological factors, 
other than economic factors. In other words, they were more con- 
cerned with the quality, education and the like of their children 
as compared to those of their neighbors and close friends. While 
financial costs of children were the main concern for most mothers, 
those who were more modern were also concerned with opportunity 
costs of children, such as the obstacle to gainful employment, job 
advancement and professional development. This difference may be 
due, in part, to the fact that those who were more modern were more 
likely to be better educated. And more educated women were more 
likely to be able to enter the labor force, especially into those 
occupations outside the area of agriculture. 
Understanding the reason for limiting family size by modernity 
level allows us to understand how children were viewed by women of 
different modernity levels. We were able to learn that children 
had less economic value for those who were more modern, but rather 
more of social and psychological values. However, a large family 
may not necessarily mean a greater social and psychological utili- 
zation of children. Therefore, it was no surprise to find that 
those who were more modern also had a small family. 
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Another interesting topic we looked at is how the decision 
to have children was formulated. About 69 percent of the women 
who were placed above average modernity expressed that they had 
formed the ideal family size since before they were married, com- 
pared to only about 61 percent for those who were below average. 
While this difference was not significant by a chi-square test, 
it suggested that modern women were more likely to formulate the 
ideal family size prior to actual marriage. But once they were 
married they were also more likely to talk and exchange ideas 
with their husbands on the topic of family building and size. A 
result from an analysis of our study found that only 17.5 percent 
of above average modernity women never consulted with the husbands, 
compared with 25.6 percent for those below average in modernity. 
The consulatjon, if not conversation, in many cases brought dis- 
agreement, rather than agreement, on the ideal family size between 
husband and wife. This was slightly more true for those who were 
more modern than for those who were more traditional. About 19 
percent of those who were above average on modernity disagreed 
with their husbands on the number of children they (husbands) would 
like to have. The comparison of the proportion of wives who pre- 
ferred a different number of children from their husbands in the 
two modernity groups found about 9 percent lower in the low group. 
This finding suggests that wives who were modern were more likely 
to be independent of their husbands in their ideas. It by no 
means should be construed that wives who were more modern were 
more likely to disagree with their husbands on the ideal family 
size. In the light of this interpretation, it should be noted 
also that a chi-square test found no statistical difference in 
terms of agreement (or disagreement) by modernity level. Thus 
our interpretation here should be taken more as suggestive than 
conclusive. 
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Consistent with our finding that women who were more modern 
were less concerned with the economic values (utility) of children, 
was the finding on the topic regularly brought up in conversation 
between the married couples. A smaller proportion of wives who 
were modern, as compared to those who were more traditional, 
reported economic subjects, such as the ways to make a living, as 
the topics most often discussed. The percentage was 7k.5 for the 
former group and 90.5 for the latter. Modern wives showed that 
they more frequently talked about the future of their children, 
including educational plans and their possible careers. In 
addition and outside of the context of family affairs, they were 
more likely to talk about social and ideological topics, for 
example, politics and community affairs. A chi-square test 
indicated that the patterns of choosing topics of conversation 
and discussion in the family were significantly different at 0.01 
level. 
Another way of understanding the decision to have a child 
is to analyze how women with different modernity levels view the 
utility of having a large number of children. It was found that 
modern women were more likely to report that there were no 
advantages to having a large number of children. And as we have 
mentioned, among those who thought there were advantages in having 
many children, traditional women were more likely to equate the 
number of children with economic function. In other words, they 
thought that the more children they had the more hands they got 
in all kinds of family work. Only a few mentioned companionship 
and warmth in the family as the major utility of children. How- 
ever, modern women were more likely to report children as one of 
their security blankets in old age. They believed that having 
many children, such as three more more, would assure them that 
they would have at least one child around to live with and help 
them in their old age. Applying a chi-square test to the 
responses found a statistical difference at 0.001 level. 
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As we were in doubt whether parents were certain that their 
children would help them in the way they desired, we asked a small 
number of women in our separate depth interviews, "Are you certain 
that your children would help you or support you in old age?" We 
were able to note that most of the women were not certain that they 
would receive what they expected from their children. Some cases 
even emphatically said that they did not expect so. But some sug- 
gested that while some parents looked for their children as the 
source of their security in old age, at the same time they realized 
that their children might not be the most reliable source of 
economic security. Still some women, especially those who were 
modern, looked for their children as more of a source of psycho- 
logical security. In our analysis when we touched upon the non- 
economic values of children, we were able to note that more modern 
women emphasized the comfort and companionship provided by children. 
Thus for modern women, the psychological and emotional benefits of 
children came to mind more readily than the practical or economic 
aspects of security. 
Applying Fishbein's Model to Fertility Decision 
According to Fishbein's (1972) model, a person's intention 
to perform a behavior (in this study having a child) is determined 
(a) by her beliefs about the consequences of performing the 
behavior and the value of these consequences for the individual, 
and (b) by her beliefs about what relevant others think she should 
do and her motivation to comply with those others. Algebraically, 
the model and the specific variables involved in these inter- 
relations may be expressed as follows: 
BI = ]3a) + NB MCi) 
i=l W i=l U2 
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BI = the behavioral intention, B = the belief that performance 
of the behavior win lead to some consequence "Xi," a1 = the value 
of "X." to the individual, NB. = the belief that a relevant other 
thinks one should or should not perform the behavior, MG = the 
motivation to comply with "Y1t' and W1 and W2 are weights reflecting 
the relative importance of each component in the determination of BI. 
Fishbein's model is an additive model of two important cornpo- 
nents: attitudinal influence and normative influence. The first 
component on the right-hand side of the equation deals with an indi- 
vidual's beliefs about what will occur if she performs the behavior 
in question, in this case having a child. The second component on 
the right-hand side of the equation deals with an individual's 
normative beliefs about performing a given behavior. Specifically, 
the component is composed of a person's beliefs of what certain 
referents think she should do (e.g., my husband thinks we should 
have a small family) and her motivation for complying with those 
referents. 
In summary, Fislibein's model suggests that two factors are 
the major determinants of intentions: a personal or attitudinal 
factor and a social or normative factor. The importance of each 
of these influences in determining intentions is expected to vary 
as a function of the type of behavior and/or individual under 
consideration. For some behaviors and individuals, intentions will 
be determined solely by attitudinal factors, while for other 
behaviors, Intentions will be determined solely by normative factors. 
Still other behaviors will be determined by both. In reviewing 
recent fertility literature, Nainboodiri and Pope (1968) point out 
two different approaches to explain fertility: one based on utility 
and the other on norms. The economic approach (e.g., Becker, 1960; 
Easterline, 1969) is based on a utility model of behavior. The 
sociological approach (e.g., Blake, 1968b; Duesenberry, 1960) is 
based on adherence to social norms. According to Naniboodiri and 
Pope (1968), it is not clear under what conditions one of these 
approaches becomes more suitable for the explanatory analysîs of 
fertility. Fishbein's model presented here incorporates both a 
subjective expected utility component and a normative component. 
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Therefore, for the purpose of our study the question of which 
approach is more suitable is of minimal importance here. 
According to Fishbein (1967), the two components of the model 
are the ale determinants of intentions. Personality variables, 
demographic variables, and other psychological and sociological 
variables can only influence intentions (arid hence behavior) 
indirectly. Any effects these variables have on intentions are 
mediated by the attitudinal and normative components of the model. 
Analyzing within the context of this theoretical framework, the 
purpose of this section is to see how fertility decisions were 
made by the influencof (a) individual beliefs and (b) normative 
beliefs. As mentioned before, the design of this study is ex 
post facto. Therefore we are not dealing with fertility intention 
per se but, moving one step further, with actual fertility behavior. 
In an attempt to formalize the decision of having children 
according to Fishbein's model, two sets of items of likert.-type, 
one of which is to measure attitudinal beliefs and the other to 
measure normative beliefs, were constructed. The responses on 
each item ranged from strongly agree, agree, qualified agree (in 
between), disagree, and strongly disagree. Responses for each 
item were converted into scores ranging from 1 to 5, with a high 
score given to favorable responses. On each item we also asked 
the value of the consequence (x) or the degree of importance 
of that consequence of having children in general, as judged by 
each respondent. The information on the degree of importance 
served, where it was appropriate, as both a and MCi. In terms 
of weighting the relative importance of the two components on the 
right hand side of the equation, we applied an equal weighting 
procedure. Our decision to assign an equal weight to each com- 
ponent stemmed from the rationale that both attitudinal beliefs 
and normative beliefs may in fact be inextricably intertwined 
in the mind and thought processes of human beings before any 
fertility decisions were realized. Applying an unequal weighting 
procedure would imply that we had some basic information to 
decide how each component operated and varied. In the absence 
of this information, an equal weighting procedure was applied 
derived at the BI, the additive summation of the two components. 
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Upon completion of the calculation of the BI, the method of 
correlation analysis was employed to determine the magnitude of 
fitness between variation in the sum scores of attitudinal and 
nortative beliefs as constructed under Fishbein's model and 
actual fertility behavior. But before proceeding to the analysis, 
the items purported to measure attitudinal beliefs and normative 
beliefs are listed as follows: 
A. Attitudinal beliefs 
Having children gives parents a feeling of happiness. 
One of the best things about having children is the 
chance to play with the children. 
One of the best things about having children is the 
love a person can receive from their children. 
k. One of the best things about having children is that 
you will never be lonely. 
Having children makes a person become more responsible. 
Having children gives you hope that yourself will be 
extended after your death. 
Having children gives you hope of happiness with any 
success that your children may achieve. 
Having children enables a woman to have a complete life. 
Having chïldren does not create any problems of child- 
care as the elder ones take care of the younger ones. 
One of the best things about having children is that 
it makes a stronger bond between husband and wife. 
One of the best things about having children is that 
it ensures you that there will be someone to inherit 
and carry on the family tradition. 
Having children makes a woman look old. 
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13. Having children forces you to give up a lot of things 
you enjoy. 
lLf. Having children is an obstacle for gainful employment 
of the mother. 
B. Normative beliefs 
Having children compels one to work hard so that he 
(she) can achieve more in one's career. 
One of the best things about having children is that 
it ensures that someone will take care of you in your 
old age. 
One of the best things about having children is that 
they will help you in making a living. 
f. Good children should help parents in various chores 
if they can. 
Children should provide remittances to the parents when 
the children go to work. 
Having children is a way of making sure that your 
family name continues. 
Having children makes a stronger bond among the 
relatives and clan. 
Having children creates a financial burden for the 
family. 
The responses to these two sets of items were converted 
into scores, and subsequently the sum scores of attitudinal and 
normative beliefs for each individual were calculated. Each 
individual's acorewas used to find the product-moment-correlation 
with: the number of children ever born, age, duration of marriage, 
education and individual score. Table 30 indicates that there was 
a correlation of 0.10 between the sum score of attitudinal and 
normative beliefs. This magnitude of correlation indicates that 
both attitudinal and normative beliefs together explain only one 
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percent of the variance in fertility. In other words, with Fishbein's 
model we understand only about one percent of the tota]. fertility 
decisions among Thai women. At the same time we noted the high 
relationship between age and marriage duration. Furthermore, the 
relationship among education, individual modernity and sum scores of 
attitudinal and normative beliefs were moderately high, indicating a 
moderate inter-relationship among the three. In terms of the path 
of relationship, education exerted its influence through individual 
modernity and the sum scores of attitudinal and normative beliefs. 
In light of this moderate inter-relationship, attitudinal and norma- 
tive beliefs might even explain less than one percent of the fertility 
decisions. In fact, the total correlation between fertility and the 
sum of the attitudinal and normative effects was reduced to only 0.0k 
when we controlled for education and modernity. This finding sug- 
gests that a decision to have any specified number of children is 
influenced more by education then attitudinal and normative beliefs. 
If attitudinal and normative beliefs have any effects on fertility, 
they are mediated by education. The education variable is broad and 
it includes the individual's ideology and philosophy in life. There- 
fore, a woman who is more independent in ideas should reflect a 
stronger educational influences on any decisions he may have made, 
than does one who is more dependent on others. This interpretation 
is substantiated by the demonstration of a stronger correlation 
between the sum scores of attitudinal and normative beliefs and 
fertility, after controlling the effects of education, among those 
women who reported that they had to listen to their husbands in 
deciding how many children they should have, than among those who 
reported that they decided the number on their own. The partial 
correlation wae 0.09 for the former group, as compared to only 0.2 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A sample of 305 ever married women, aged 15_ 149 from two 
provinces, Nongkai and Lumpoon, were selected for interviews on 
the subject of fertility decision and the reasons which led to a 
desire to have children. 
On the average, the women in our sample had 3.2 children. 
About 76.k percent of them ever used some methods of contraception. 
Most of them used the pill; and female sterilization was the second 
popular method. 
In terms of family decisions our data indicates that almost 
all Thai couples planned their family size and chose the time they 
would like to have their children well in advance before they 
pursued the fertility goal. The fertility decisions that the women 
made were not totally independent of any sources of influence. 
Relatives and friends and neighbors were quite important and could 
exert some influence on the decisions of the women. This indicates 
that having children may be influenced by a normative pattern which 
the members of a society should observe. In our case, it was found 
that there was a norm of family size of three children. This norm 
was couched in terms of the size that is neither too large nor too 
small, and it it within the range that quality children can be 
realistically brought up. 
Aside from relativos, friends and neighbors, parents and 
husbands also had some influence on the decisions of a significant 
proportion of women. Their influence seems to be characterized 
along with those of relatives by a close and tight family interaction. 
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If we look at the general picture of what led the women to 
decide to have children, we see a mixture of several interwoven 
factors. While economic factors may visibly stand out in front, 
it cannot be felt alone without the support of several other 
factors, most notably socia]. and psychological ones. There were 
indications that several factors, at one point under one condition, 
were conducive to high fertility; but usually they were countered 
by several other fertility depressing factors. Judging from the 
responses, there was some confusion in the minds of the respondents. 
They found it very difficult to differentiate the advantages from 
the disadvantages of having many children. More modern women were 
somewhat more capable in making any differentiation and deciding 
what were their desires or goals in life. Under any circumstances, 
more modern women looked for more psychological gratification from 
having children in the family. Less modern women looked more for 
economic benefits, but still would not deny any social and psycho- 
logical gratifications. 
It is important to note and mention some of the mixed feelings 
and attitudes and perceptions of having children that were depicted 
by some of the respondents: Children were perceived as assets but 
they are consumptive assets; Children may very well be an important 
condition in creating an atmosphere of tender love and care in the 
family and making life worth living, but parents also at the same 
time or at one time or another have to go through and cope with the 
ordeal of emotional and physical strains in child rearing. Children 
may bring hope for future success or even an extension of self but 
the present time must be contemplated first, or else children may 
not live for tomorrow. Children may help man become more responsible, 
but some just do not want to have any responsibility. These are some 
of the responses that substantiate that there are multi-factors and 
multi-dimensions involved in the decision to have children. These 
multi-factors and multi-dimensions have unavoidably obfuscated the 
understanding of the fertility decision. 
7? 
An attempt to formalize several inextricably interwoven 
factors was carried out under Fishbein's model of understanding 
behavioral decision. However, only a little understanding of 
fertility behavior was achieved. On the whole we can explain 
only one percent of the decisions made by the Thai women. This 
small achievement is thought to be accounted for by two main 
reasons. First, we simply did not penetrate deeply and broadly 
enough into other realms of life; there were so many other things 
that we left out of the model. Second, the model in itself was 
too specific in scope. It only touches upon beliefs. There are 
many other aspects of psychology that we need to take into consi- 
deration before understanding any decisions. For example, attitude, 
value, needs, and motivation should be incorporated into the model 
so that a larger magnitude of variances in fertility decisions can 
be explained. 
Policy Implication 
We have not reached the point where we can predict fertility 
decisions in the fashion that is most often an ultimate goal in 
the scientific field of population. This strong desire for predic- 
tion has its policy implications for understandable reasons under 
the scaffolding of population control and management. 
At present, Thailand's population growth rate is estimated 
at about 2.1 percent per annum (Kamnuansilpa, 1979). This rate 
of growth can still continue to create and exacerbate a number of 
problems which retard the social and economic development of the 
country. For this reason the Thai government will continue its 
support for the efforts to reduce fertility through voluntary 
practice of family planning. At present, the National Economic 
and Social Development Board is contemplating a plan to reduce 
the population growth to 1.5 percent by 1986. Thus, the process 
of fertility reduction can be greatly facilitated by an under- 
standing of fertility decisions. 
78 
We found that financial and opportunity costs of children 
were considered to be the major disadvantage in having a large 
number of children. The costs of children are operating in the 
direction of reducing fertility. At the saine time, the pension 
motive or the need to be secure in old age creates a desire for 
more progeny, which of course, is conducive to population growth. 
Still children were considered by many to have economic utility, 
but not without some cost, namely financial, social and psycholo- 
gical. We found that married Thai women or Thai couples, to be 
more general, did not make any fertility decisions on account of 
any single factor or dimension. Therefore it seems to us that, 
based on the results of the findings here, it is unimaginative to 
implicate any fertility reducation plans, based on any single 
factor, be it economic, social or psychological in nature. What 
is suggested here is that several factors have to be taken into 
consideration in the implementation of any fertility control 
program. 
Since it is more in the interest of the population policy 
planners to look at the factors that are conducive to high fer- 
tility, we can disregard those that are depressant, at least 
until the country changes its policy stance from anti-natalist 
to pro-natalist. The first thing that we will look at is the 
economic utility of children. Children were perceived to be 
particlarly useful, in a productivo sense, in agricultural com- 
munities where farms are large but mechanization is low, and 
educational opportunities are limited or lagging. In this 
situation Arnold and Pejaranonda (19??) suggested that government 
policies could accelerate the decline in productive utility by 
fostering strong child labor, and increasing educational opportu- 
nities. The first of these policies would make children less 
necessary for productive help, and the last two policies would 
make children less available to help. All of these policies are 
desirable in their own right. Their positive effect on fertility 
control programs make their implementation more urgent. 
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The next aspect we will look at is the social context of 
fertility. We have learned that there is a strong impulse, if 
not a clear norm, among the Thai to bring up "quality" children. 
The desire to see children successful in life is omnipresent. 
Education is one of the important credentials necessary for 
entering many, if not all, careers. Putting these together, we 
suggest a policy for increasing school enrollment at all levels. 
One way of achieving this is to increase the minimum amount of 
compulsory education and provide better access to education at 
the local level. This policy would have at least three anti- 
natalist effects. First, by keeping children in school longer 
they would be kept out of the labor force longer, thus reducing 
the amount of time they could devote to working. Secondly, pro- 
ducing better educated and higher "quality" children would mean 
that a smaller number of children per family would be more corn- 
patable with the costs entailed. Finally, higher levels of 
education tend to expose children to modern ideas and philosophies 
which would undoubtedly lead to lower fertility when these children 
reach childbearing age. 
In a psychological context, the warmth and security, parti- 
cularly in old age, for having children is one of the most 
difficult things to operate in the policy package. The warmth 
and gratification of having children and being with them can only 
be dealt with indirectly by introducing an element of family 
education into the school curriculum. With this so-called family 
education we can reorient the younger generation so that a better 
family environment and interaction can be realized. Perhaps the 
designed information that with only two children parents can more 
nearly project themselves into the future of the children1 or 
with a small family a closer relationship and attention can be 
maintained, should be directed to the future parents of Thailand. 
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In terms of security, however, there may be an element of 
economic security or pension motive involved. The government 
should design a program of provision for alternative sources of 
security. These sources of security could take the form of public 
or private social security and pensions plans, unemployment and 
health insurance, or even better housing and medical care for the 
elderly. Jhïle such plans might be difficult to implement in 
Thailand because the Thai economy is heavily based on agriculture, 
the government should at least start and accelerate some similar 
welfare or security programs that are in the interests of the 
elderly. Psychologically, the government should make an effort 
to change the perception that the state will not be active in 
taking care of the aged, and that it is only within the responsi- 
bility of each individual family to take care of the aged. 
Research has indicated that the Thai family has been the only 
institution which is active and functional for the needs of the 
aged (Kamnuansilpa, Kamalanavin and Ragthaidee, 1980). There 
were indications that while some parents may not put too much 
hope on their children as the most reliable source of security, 
at the same time they realized that there was no alternative 
source that they could look or hope for. Given the fact that 
fertility rates have been declining in Thailand, the proportion 
of the aged population has been inevitably increasing. As the 
aging process of the population is underway, the needs of the 
elderly should be taken into consideration and included or incor- 
porated into the national development plans. The provision of at 
least some basic needs will, in the long run, reduce the desire 
for a large family. 
In summary, we have suggested the ways in which policies 
supportive of a low level of fertility in Thailand can be imple- 
mented. In short, we have suggested that better educational 
opportunities, stricter child labor laws, more rapid mechanization 
of agriculture and the provisions of social security and welfare 
benefits for the elderly be implemented. All these together could 
most likely reduce the desire for children, thus keeping the level 
of fertility down. The important factor for the success of the 
population control program in Thailand is to keep the number of 
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